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Abstract 
Throughout 10 May 1940-22 April 1942, British forces conducted a military 
occupation of Iceland. There were two initial reasons for this venture: firstly, in order to 
acquire air and naval bases to combat German forces situated along the Norwegian coast; and 
secondly, in order to prevent the island from coming under German control, thus guarding 
against encirclement. Whitehall certainly considered it an advantageous undertaking. 
However, as this dissertation shall show, such beliefs were swiftly escalated. During June 
1940, after France’s capitulation, the retention and defence of Iceland became all the more 
important. It was essential, for example, that Britain could maintain at least one clear access 
route in and out the North Atlantic. Failure to do so would surely have lead to her starvation 
and/or military defeat. As a result, and along with other important reasons discussed herein, 
over 20,000 British Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force personnel, supported at various 
points by American and Canadian troops, were eventually stationed there.  
Unfortunately, there are very few publications on the British invasion and occupation 
of Iceland, notwithstanding a few specialist works. Those works that do exist, however, read 
more like chronological narratives, rather than analytical studies. Consequently, there exists 
some exciting opportunities for the historiography’s expansion, not just in size, but also in 
nature of content. This dissertation, entitled ‘The Uninvited Guests: Britain’s Military Forces 
in Iceland, 1940-1942’, contributes to that much needed expansion.  
This dissertation looks at the British occupation of Iceland over two periods: the 
invasion period, 10-19 May 1940, and the occupation period, 20 May 1940-22 April 1942. It 
assesses the effects and consequences of both the invasion and occupation, and tries to 
determine how far they preserved Icelandic freedoms and secured Allied interests in Northern 
Europe. Indeed, this dissertation shows that the invasion and initial occupation of Iceland was 
a complete military disaster, one that offered no benefit to either the Icelanders or Allies. If 
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anything, it put the Icelanders at greater risk of harm from German retaliation. This 
dissertation also shows that Britain made good its early deficiencies by eventually bringing 
security and prosperity to Iceland, where before there had been none, and by positively 
utilising Iceland in the war against Germany. The conclusions of this dissertation are 
fascinating; they show that it is possible to cultivate rich reward from an operation that could 
have been destined for complete disaster. 
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Notes to Reader 
Icelandic contains some additional letters not seen within English. These are Áá, Ðð, 
Éé, Íí, Óó, Úú, Ýý, Þþ, Ææ and Öö.
1
 Gunnar Karlsson describes their various uses:   
 
The letters á, é, ó, and æ denoted long vowels in the medieval language, but now 
stand for diphthongs [...]. The difference between i and í, u and ú, was also one of 
length in the old language, but now they have different values: i is like i in ‘pin’, í like 
ee in ‘see; ú is similar to English u in ‘loom’ and ‘woumb’, whilst u has no close 
equivalents in English. In modern Icelandic y and ý have the same values as i and í. Ö 
sounds similar to u in ‘but’. Ð and þ denote a fricative: ð is the voiced variant, like th 
in ‘brother’ and ‘weather’, and þ the unvoiced one like th in ‘thin’.2 
 
An alphabet incorporating Icelandic letters should appear as follows: Aa/Áá, Bb, Cc, Dd, Ðð, 
Ee/Éé, Ff, Gg, Hh, Ii/Íí, Jj, Kk, Ll, Mm, Nn, Oo/Óó, Pp, Qq, Rr Ss, Tt, Uu/Úú, Vv, Ww, Xx, 
Yy/Ýý, Zz, Þþ, Ææ and Öö.
3
 
 This dissertation was originally submitted for examination at the University of 
Chester on 11 October 2012. Any grammatical or typographical errors discovered since then 
have been omitted or rectified. These changes fail to affect the document’s look, feel or text 
in any substantial way. 
 
 
                                                             
1
 Gunnar Karlsson, Iceland’s 1100 Years: The History of a Marginal Society (London: Hurst, 2000), p. xiii. 
 
2
 Ibid. 
 
3
 Ibid. 
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Introduction 
Iceland is an isolated seafaring nation situated in the North Atlantic (see figures one 
and two).
1
  It has a single landmass totalling some 40,000 square miles – more than twice 
Denmark’s size – which all but touches the Arctic Circle.2  Along with Newfoundland, 
Greenland and the Faroe archipelago, Iceland constitutes one of four highly strategic 
steppingstones, indeed weapon platforms, between Northern Europe and North America.
3
  
‘Whoever possesses Iceland’,4 writes Winston S. Churchill, ‘holds a pistol firmly pointed at 
England, America and Canada.’5  Two similar theories, both formulated during the Second 
World War, 1939-1945, are also publicised by Leslie Roberts and George Fielding Eliot.
6
  
With reference to landscape, Iceland bears a limited resemblance towards its many 
and varied European neighbours.
7
  Substantiating this point, Eric Linklater writes: 
 
He must deprive Ireland of nearly all its roads; elevate the larger part […] to several 
thousand feet, and cover it with an ice-cap; complicate it with extinct or quiescent 
volcanoes and hot springs; girdle it with swamps and lava fields and furious winds; 
and give it a population of largely built and sturdy men, of handsome young women.
8
 
 
                                                             
1
 G. Karlsson, Iceland’s 1100 Years: The History of a Marginal Society (London: Hurst and Co., 2000), p. 9. 
 
2
 Ibid.; W. R. Mead, ‘Renaissance of Iceland’, Economic Geography, 21 (1945), p. 136; and E. Linklater, The 
Northern Garrisons (London: HMSO, 1941), p. 18. 
 
3
 W. S. Churchill, The Second World War (London: Pimlico, 2002), p. 401. 
 
4
 Ibid. 
 
5
 Ibid. 
 
6
 G. L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), p. 1; L. Roberts, ‘They Never Had Seen a Soldier’, The Saturday Earning Post, 213 (1940), p. 20; 
and G. F. Eliot, ‘If an Allied Defeat, What?’, Life, 8 (1940), p. 29. 
 
7
 G. Hálfdanarson, Historical Dictionary of Iceland (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2008), p. vii. 
 
8
 Linklater, The Northern Garrisons, p. 34. 
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Little vegetation, including grass, grows.
9
  Rock fragments and dust lie scattered and 
abundant.
10
  No fossil fuels exist.
11
  An unfavourable climate and prolonged winter restricts 
agricultural production.
12
  ‘Fully four-fifths of’13  Iceland’s interior, writes William Charles 
Chamberlin, ‘is not suited to human habitation’.14  For these reasons, many first time visitors 
have, on arrival, developed fairly critical preliminary reactions.
15
  Substantiating this point, 
David Rissik writes: 
 
The first impressions of a newcomer to Iceland are not exactly favourable.  The 
complete absence of trees and hedgerows gives it a forbidding appearance and long 
stretches of rocks, stones and lava dust, devoid of even the scantiest vegetation, lend 
added force to a general impression of austerity.
16
 
  
Throughout c. 750-c. 800, the inhabitants of Scandinavia made significant 
advancements in their technological abilities and, due to this achievement, wider 
transactions.
17
  They constructed oceangoing vessels, using them to traverse the North 
                                                             
9
 M. C. Bilder and J. G. Bilder, A Foot Soldier for Patton: The Story of a ‘Red Diamond’ Infantryman with the 
US Third Army (Drexel: Casemate, 2008), p. 43 and Roberts, ‘They Never Had Seen a Soldier’, The Saturday 
Evening Post, p. 89. 
 
10
 W. C. Chamberlin, Economic Development of Iceland through World War II (New York: AMS Press, 1968), 
p. 8. 
 
11
 Mead, ‘Renaissance of Iceland’, Economic Geography, p. 136. 
 
12
 Hálfdanarson, Historical Dictionary of Iceland, s.v. AGRICUTURE.  For a brief but insightful War Office 
appraisal of Iceland’s climate, see The National Archives, WO 106/3034, ‘Alabaster: Plan and First 
Maintenance Project’, 11 May 1940, Appendix B. 
 
13
 Chamberlin, Economic Development of Iceland through World War II, p. 8. 
 
14
 Ibid., p. 9. 
 
15
 P. A. Coggin, The British Occupation of Iceland (Victoria: Trafford Publishing, c. 2009), p. 10. 
 
16
 D. Rissik, The DLI at War: The History of the Durham Light Infantry, 1939-1945 (Brancepeth: The Durham 
Light Infantry, c. 1954), p. 77. 
 
17
 Karlsson, Iceland’s 1100 Years, pp. 9-10. 
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Atlantic and make contact with the British Isles, France and Russia.
18
  Such exploration also 
resulted in the discovery and colonisation of Iceland.
19
  Whilst not confirmed for certain, it 
has been widely suggested, following various scientific investigations, that this event 
occurred during and/or after c. 870.
20
  ‘Wherever Norsemen settled’,21 writes Gunnar 
Karlsson, ‘they established a regular assembly [...] of all free males.’22  In Iceland, this 
primitive form of legislature, known as the Alþingi (hereafter anglicised as Althing) was 
established during c. 930, a time when population numbers ranged between 20,000 and 
105,000.
23
  Thenceforth, over 300 years of independent governance, a period known as 
Iceland’s Golden Age, proceeded.24 
During 1262, King Hákon Hákonarson, ruler of Norway, expanded his empire by 
annexing Iceland.
25
  There exists numerous suggestions as to why the general populace freely 
surrendered much of their autonomy to him; reasons for this decision remain a perennial 
enigma.
26
  Those arguments put forward, however, are all entirely credible: a tiredness of 
inter-tribal warfare, a lack of executive regulation, and a fear of complete isolation.
27
 
Norwegian rule, it should be understood, did not last long.
28
  After countless years of war and 
                                                             
18
 Karlsson, Iceland’s 1100 Years, pp. 9-10. 
 
19
 Ibid., p. 11. 
 
20
 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
 
21
 Ibid., p. 20. 
 
22
 Ibid. 
 
23
 Ibid. and S. Thorarinsson, ‘Population Changes in Iceland’, Geographical Review, 51 (1961), p. 519.  This 
date also marks the end of the settlement period. 
 
24
 B. Gröndal, Iceland: From Neutrality to NATO Membership (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1971), p. 13. 
 
25
 Karlsson, Iceland’s 1100 Years, p. 83. 
 
26
 Ibid., p. 84. 
 
27
 Ibid.; Chamberlin, Economic Development of Iceland through World War II, p. 10; and Gröndal, Iceland, p. 
13. 
 
28
 Karlsson, Iceland’s 1100 Years, p. 102. 
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intermarriage, Norway became inherited by King Olav Håkonsson, ruler of Denmark (see 
figure three).
29
  This event, during 1380, forged these two nations into a union, one that 
would last until 1814.
30
  Iceland, on the other hand, had no choice but to accept subjugation 
under the Danish Crown, with control not officially relinquished until 1944.
31
 
The Icelandic people, rooted from warrior races, have not always been unfamiliar 
with, or completely opposed to arms and armour.
32
  When weaponry was readily available, 
marauding undesirables could expect strong resistance from well organised and proficient 
defenders.
33
  ‘In 1431,’34 writes Benedikt Gröndal, ‘there was a massive battle between 
British privateers and Icelanders in the Skagafjörður district in which eighty pirates were 
killed.’35  The case of Gunnarr Hámundarson, ‘Iceland’s most celebrated archer’,36 writes 
William R. Short, also substantiates this point.  Whilst defending his home, he 
singlehandedly ‘killed or wounded […] ten attackers’.37  Such ferocity, however, slowly 
subsided during and/or after c. 1500, the result of a lengthy disarmament programme 
instigated by several successive kings to quell civil conflict and lawlessness.
38
  These 
initiatives were highly successful, fostering widespread aversion to military hardware.
39
 
                                                             
29
 Karlsson, Iceland’s 1100 Years, p. 102. 
 
30
 Hálfdanarson, Historical Dictionary of Iceland, s.v. DENMARK and Karlsson, Iceland’s 1100 Years, p. 102. 
 
31
 Karlsson, Iceland’s 1100 Years, p. 102. 
 
32
 Gröndal, Iceland, p. 14. 
 
33
 Ibid. 
 
34
 Ibid. 
 
35
 Ibid. 
 
36
 W. R. Short, Icelanders in the Viking Age: The People of the Sagas (Jefferson: McFarland and Co., 2010), p. 
50. 
 
37
 Ibid., p. 51. 
 
38
 Gröndal, Iceland, p. 14 and Hálfdanarson, Historical Dictionary of Iceland, s.v. DEFENSE. 
 
39
 Hálfdanarson, Historical Dictionary of Iceland, s.v. DEFENSE. 
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 Without an effective deterrent, Iceland possessed no ability to defend itself and 
protect its interests.
40
  Two examples of this dangerous situation, both taken from the second 
Anglo-Danish war, 1807-1814, demonstrate as much.
41
  Firstly, during 1807, the Royal Navy 
impounded sixteen merchant ships, each laden with goods, which were headed for Iceland.
42
  
Had these vessels, following substantial lobbying by an influential Englishman called Sir 
Joseph Banks, not been released, the Icelanders would have suffered great economic hardship 
and malnutrition, if not complete famine.
43
  Secondly, during 1809, Royal Navy warships, in 
their capacity as enemy belligerents, sailed to Iceland unchecked and unchallenged.
44
  On 
arrival, Captain Francis John Knott, of HMS Rover, did not claim the island as a British 
territory, despite this idea being considered, because, writes Gröndal, it ‘would have brought 
His Majesty more expense than profit’.45  Whilst both these events, historically, were of no 
consequence, they illustrate how helpless Iceland had become, how totally at the mercy it was 
to more powerful nations.
46
 
 Throughout the First World War, 1914-1918, due to recurring communication 
difficulties with Denmark, the Icelanders obtained, albeit unofficially, their second taste of 
independent governance, something not experienced for more than 600 years.
47
  This 
                                                             
40
 Gröndal, Iceland, p. 14. 
 
41
 Ibid., p. 15 and A. C. O’Dell, The Scandinavian World (London: Longman, Green, and Co., 1957), p. 373. 
 
42
 Gröndal, Iceland, p. 15. 
 
43
 J. Gascoigne, ‘Banks, Sir Joseph, baronet (1743–1820)’ in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed.  L. 
Goldman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/1300> [23 July 
2012], para. 10 of 24 and Gröndal, Iceland, p. 15. 
 
44
 Gröndal, Iceland, p. 15. 
 
45
 Ibid. 
 
46
 D. F. Bittner, The Lion and the White Falcon: Britain and Iceland in the World War II Era (Hamden: Archon 
Books, 1983), p. 20. 
 
47
 M. Howard, The First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 1 and S. B. J. Hardarson, ‘The 
“Republic of Iceland” 1940-1944: Anglo-American Attitudes and Influences’, Journal of Contemporary 
History, 9 (1974), p. 27. 
6 
 
unforeseen situation strengthened nationalist sentiment, awoken during the 1800’s, and led to 
increasing calls for renewed autonomy.
48
  These demands were eventually met following 
ratification of the 1918 Dano-Icelandic Act of Union, an Act that accorded the Althing home 
rule.
49
  ‘Denmark and Iceland are free and sovereign states’,50 the treaty stipulated, ‘united by 
a common King’.51  To ensure, however, that the former retained some degree of influence 
over the latter, it also stipulated that Denmark would remain ‘entrusted with the safeguard of 
Iceland’s foreign affairs.’52  In addition, although no expiry date oversaw any contractual 
obligations, provision was laid down so that, should either party request it, negotiations could 
commence following 31 December 1940 for the union to be severed.
53
  If negotiations did 
commence and, after three years, came to nothing, then either the Althing or Rigsdag – 
Denmark’s legislature – had right to cease the union following a successful referendum of 
two thirds majority.
54
  This new situation ‘was seen’55 by all Icelanders, writes Sólrun B. 
Jensdóttir Hardarson, ‘as an important step towards complete independence’.56 
 ‘Britain had traditionally taken Iceland for granted’,57 writes Donald F. Bittner, an 
‘attitude from the Royal Navy’s command of the sea, the distance of the island from 
                                                             
48
 Hardarson, ‘The “Republic of Iceland” 1940-1944’, Journal of Contemporary History, p. 27. 
 
49
 Ibid. 
 
50
 R. W. Flournoy and M. O. Hudson, eds., A Collection of Nationality Laws of Various Countries: As 
Contained in Constitutions, Statutes, and Treaties (New York: Oxford University Press, 1929), p. 688. 
 
51
 Ibid. 
 
52
 Ibid. 
 
53
 Ibid., p.690 
 
54
 A. H. Thomas, Historical Dictionary of Denmark (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2009), s.v. RIGSDAG and 
Flournoy and Hudson, eds., A Collection of Nationality Laws of Various Countries, p. 690. 
 
55
 Hardarson, ‘The “Republic of Iceland” 1940-1944’, Journal of Contemporary History, p. 27. 
 
56
 Ibid. 
 
57
 Bittner, The Lion and the White Falcon, p. 16. 
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London’s European enemies, and the island nature of the Icelandic state.’58  Throughout 
1933-1940, however, this complacency disintegrated.
59
  Charles Howard-Smith – a towering 
figure in Anglo-Icelandic relations and someone who and whose work shall be analysed in 
due course – demonstrates this U-turn succinctly: ‘If […] [the British] can fly to Prague and 
back so can the Germans fly equal distances’.60   
On 29 November 1933, Sir Hugh Gurney, Britain’s minister to Denmark, became the 
first high-powered British official, during the six year period that preceded the Second World 
War, to monitor and document German activity in Iceland.
61
  He noted disturbing increases in 
Nazism, a fascist philosophy which had, after just eleven months, attained significant support 
from the nation’s youth.62  It transpired that these Icelandic Nazis, like those who operated 
under Adolf Hitler throughout 1925-1933, sought credibility by aligning their political goals 
alongside prevalent local issues; they campaigned robustly for the formation of an outright 
republic.
63
  Six months later, on 8 May 1934, another report, this time by Howard Little, a 
lecturer in English at the University of Iceland, Reykjavík, echoed Gurney’s observations.64  
‘Conditions here are developing strangely.  On May 1 the Nazis had a march through the 
town, Banners and Band, the biggest procession I have ever seen here.’65  His bad tidings did 
not cease there: 
 
                                                             
58
 Bittner, The Lion and the White Falcon, p. 16. 
 
59
 Ibid., pp. 16-25. 
 
60
 The National Archives, FO 371 24779, minute by Howard-Smith, 2 May 1940. 
 
61
 Bittner, The Lion and the White Falcon, p. 17. 
 
62
 Ibid. 
 
63
 Bittner, The Lion and the White Falcon, p. 17. 
 
64
 Ibid. 
 
65
 The National Archives, FO 371/18262, Little to Hume, 8 May 1934. 
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In Reykjavík there are now more than 550 German residents, nearly 400 of these are 
young men, they formed the main part of the Nazi procession.  Should there come 
war, Germany could take this Island with the population she already has here.  There 
is no force capable of opposing these young men and, so far as I can see, there is 
nothing to prevent the Consul from having already armed this body.
66
 
 
Despite being branded as an ‘alarmist’,67 Little, who had despatched numerous such letters 
via George Hume MP, successfully alerted the British government to Iceland’s gross 
vulnerability.
68
  Consequently, a ‘change in perceptions’,69 writes Bittner, ‘soon 
commenced’.70   
 Three years later, Little’s security concerns, which were not unique to him, had been 
far from allayed.
71
  In a letter sent from A. C. Höyer to the British Naval Intelligence 
Division, a letter which was, due to its high political content, redirected to the Foreign Office, 
numerous comments reaffirmed that the ‘Nazi movement [remained] very active’.72  These 
comments also affirmed that German agents were ‘busy there now’,73 and that German 
residents were, in the event of war with Britain, preparing for their nation’s military forces to 
‘immediately occupy’74 the island.  Whilst Höyer’s report was received with scepticism, as 
                                                             
66
 The National Archives, FO 371/18262, Little to Hume, 8 May 1934. 
 
67
 Ibid., minute by an unidentified individual, 27 June 1934, p. 2. 
 
68
 Bittner, The Lion and the White Falcon, p. 17. 
 
69
 Ibid. 
 
70
 Ibid. 
 
71
 Ibid., p. 18 
 
72
 Ibid. and The National Archives, FO 371/21075, summary of Höyer to Bassett, 8 February 1937. 
 
73
 The National Archives, FO 371/21075, summary of Höyer to Bassett, 8 February 1937, p. 2. 
 
74
 Ibid. 
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was Little’s, a change in attitude immediately took place.75  This purported German activity, 
after all, corresponded with the multiple allegations that had previously been made.
76
  
Therefore, instead of being dismissed forthwith as improbable, the Foreign Office ordered its 
newly upgraded and installed consul general, John Bowering, to ‘investigate’,77 
demonstrating a modicum of concern.   His findings, as shall be detailed, would have 
certainly alleviated much of their worry: 
 
According to the summary of Mr. Höyer’s letter, the Nazi movement is very strong in 
Iceland and there are many Nazi sympathisers.  In my opinion, the movement is 
mainly in the hands of boys and girls of the merchant class who are below the voting 
age.  […]  The summery mentioned states further that German spies are busy in 
Iceland.  It is difficult to believe this statement or to visualise the field of their 
activity, since in this country there are no military or naval defences.
78
 
 
This evaluation seemingly vindicated the Foreign Office’s decision to rebuff Little’s remarks.  
Notwithstanding, Bowering did offer a word of warning: ‘It is […] true that the Germans 
have done much to court Icelandic favour, both by sending distinguished visitors and by 
publishing laudatory books and pamphlets.’79  Another method, hitherto unmentioned, was by 
trade.
80
  During 1934, Berlin sought to obtain Iceland as a trading partner.
81
  In order to 
                                                             
75
 Bittner, The Lion and the White Falcon, p. 18. 
 
76
 Ibid. 
 
77
 The National Archives, FO 371/21075, minutes by Falla and Collier, 22 February 1937. 
 
78
 The National Archives, FO 371/21075, ‘Memorandum’, p. 1.  This four page document is not easily 
identifiable.  It begins with a brief description of Höyer and then proceeds to analyse Höyer’s letter to Bassett.  
Page one displays the word confidential, pages two to four do not.  No date is issued. 
 
79
 Ibid. 
 
80
 Bittner, The Lion and the White Falcon, p. 24. 
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facilitate this new relationship, an official delegation of German representatives visited 
Reykjavík around November.
82
  In return for increased orders of ponies and fish, they 
requested that thirty-five percent of Iceland’s imports, those initially of German origin, be 
despatched direct from Germany rather than Denmark.
83
   
Throughout 1938-1939, Berlin’s attempts to seduce Iceland, like a desperate suitor 
vying for affection, went into overdrive.
84
  If Hitler and his political accomplices had not 
previously been trying to influence this prospective ally, they certainly were trying to now; 
these leaders knew how strategically important the island would be in a war against Britain.
85
  
Advances were open, forceful, and diverse in nature.
86
 Not even London’s most inept 
observer could now have remained unaware that the Nazis, whilst ‘making every effort to 
create a friendly feeling’,87 wanted to encroach on Icelandic way of life.  The first year, 1938, 
saw established, firstly, Germany’s apparent scientific interest, demonstrated by the despatch 
of numerous teams to investigate various anthropological and geographical subjects, and 
secondly, Germany’s good will, demonstrated by the organisation of football matches.88  
Assistance with aeronautical hobbies, predominantly gliding, also constituted a significant 
gesture.
89
  Over the years leading up to 1938, gliding had developed into a major pastime, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
81
 The National Archives, FO 371/19429, ‘Denmark and Iceland: Annual Report, 1934’, 19 January 1935, p. 46. 
 
82
 Ibid. 
 
83
 Ibid. 
 
84
 Bittner, The Lion and the White Falcon, p. 19. 
 
85
 Ibid., p. 50. 
 
86
 Ibid., p. 19. 
 
87
 The National Archives, FO 371/23637, ‘Denmark and Iceland: Annual Report, 1938’, 4 February 1939, p. 25. 
 
88
 Ibid. and Bittner, The Lion and the White Falcon, pp. 19 and 21. 
 
89
 Bittner, The Lion and the White Falcon, p. 19. 
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particularly for rich and wealthy Icelanders.
90
  As a result, German gliding instructors 
travelled to Iceland and offered free tuition in return for their travel fare.
91
  Whether this act 
of generosity was state sponsored or not remains unclear, however, along with the many other 
munificent acts, it attracted the attention of the Foreign Office.
92
  In addition, there was also 
an unsettling incident concerning the violation of Icelandic security.
93
  When Germany’s 
minister to Denmark, Cécil von Renthe-Fink, paid an official visit to Iceland, his trip 
coincided with an impromptu visit by the German cruiser Emden.
94
  A show of strength 
proceeded; Emden’s sailors marched through Reykjavík to Nazi songs.95  This transgression, 
for that is how it was perceived, greatly unsettled everybody.
96
  As a result, Bowering, who 
had dutifully recorded every aspect of German activity since his inception as consul general, 
notified London.
97
 
The second year, 1939, saw established an increase in activity from Germany’s 
scientific teams.
98
  Many of these scientists, reportedly commissioned by Heinrich Himmler, 
were less than qualified for the research they purported to undertake.
99
  Furthermore, their 
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work was of dubious quality and, more importantly, suspected of harbouring ulterior motives 
such as invasion planning.
100
  Substantiating this point, Bittner writes: 
 
Although the cultural and historical centres of Iceland were in the south and 
southwest, the anthropologists concentrated in the northeast.  […] [They also] 
laboured in areas of flat and sandy terrain admirably suited for aircraft landing 
grounds or which had sheltered and deep harbours.
101
 
 
For this reason, the Althing became so concerned it decided to pass a resolution which 
stipulated, firstly, ‘need for more extensive and better organised investigations’,102 and 
secondly, ‘that no investigations […] [could] be carried out by foreigners except in co-
operation with and with the permission of the Board controlling’103 such endeavours.  
Eventually, during March 1939, perhaps the most serious act of German harassment, which 
would ultimately backfire, took place.
104
  One undisclosed day, the German cruiser Emden, 
mentioned earlier, and a delegation from Lufthansa, Germany’s principle airline, arrived 
unannounced, simultaneously, and, so it initially appeared, on separate business.
105
  The 
former intended to undertake a six week visit, the latter to initiate some favourable aviation 
agreements between both Lufthansa and the Icelandic government which they perceived to 
have existed since 1931.
106
  This joint visit, however, appeared less coincidental the more 
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Reykjavík considered refusing.
107
  When pressuring statements, aggressively supportive of 
Lufthansa’s bid, arrived from Berlin, and when it was realised that German military activity 
had suddenly increased around Iceland’s territorial waters, it is hardly surprising both 
Reykjavík and London saw the whole exchange, writes Bittner, as ‘a veiled attempt at 
gunboat diplomacy’.108  Therefore, the Icelandic government completely rejected Lufthansa’s 
concessions request, maintaining a need for impartiality.
109
   
Throughout 1938-1939, Icelanders from all walks of life had remained very wary of 
Germany’s interest.110  Some went so far as to call it ‘aggression’.111  They were also deeply 
frustrated by Britain’s apparent naivety, or apathy, to what was happening.112  These attitudes 
came to light during May 1939 through an intelligence gathering mission, masquerading as a 
holiday in Iceland undertaken by Foreign Office clerk B. E. F. Gage.
113
  At last, after two 
years of procrastination and, due to this idleness, increasing worry, London had taken some 
tangible action.
114
  Gage hoped, by drawing on Bowering’s previous notifications, to 
establish once and for all what ‘the Icelandic government and Icelanders in general [felt] 
towards […] [Britain] and Germany’,115 and also ‘to obtain some idea of the scope and 
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degree of successes of German’116 activity.  What he discovered was less than reassuring and 
would, ultimately, go some way in changing British policy.
117  
London’s decision to invade and occupy Iceland did not, contrary to popular belief, 
result from one factor but several.
118
  On 29 April 1940, just under eight months into Anglo-
German hostilities, senior Admiralty personnel concluded that, following the substantial 
build-up of enemy air and naval bases along the Norwegian coast, it would be necessary to 
counter these threats by constructing similar such facilities within North Atlantic waters.
119
  
They also predicted that Germany, in face of strategic necessity, would have little regard for 
Iceland’s neutrality, a turn of events which already afflicted Denmark.120  Furthermore, and 
most unsettling of all, an understanding was reached as to what Britain’s response would be 
should German forces make landfall: 
 
It is […] evident that a German landing in Iceland, being a direct menace to […] 
[homeland] security, would have as its consequence that the shores of Iceland became 
[sic] a battle-ground on which […] [British forces] should be compelled to take 
extreme measures for the destruction of the enemy.
121
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On 30 April 1940, one day later, these three key sentiments were evaluated by senior Foreign 
Office personnel, who quickly concurred with them.
122
  Consequently, to enable the first and 
prevent both the second and third, preparation for an expedition, codenamed Operation Fork, 
commenced.
123
  Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Undersecretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, provides in his diary a good insight into the psychological condition of Britain’s 
leaders throughout this period: ‘Planning [the] conquest of Iceland for next week.  Shall 
probably be too late!’124  On 6 May 1940, with Britain’s strategic situation in dire straits, 
Fork was finalised and approved.
125
  On 8 May 1940, two days later, the 2
nd
 Royal Marine 
Battalion set sail on four Royal Navy ships: two destroyers – HMS Berwick and HMS 
Glasgow – and two cruisers – HMS Fortune and HMS Fearless.126  As shall be detailed, 
these troops were undertaking, what could justifiably have been seen as, a suicide mission.
127
 
London had never wanted to illegally trespass on Icelandic territory, neither had it 
wanted to force war onto a nation that sought peace.
128
  For this reason, diplomacy was 
attempted first, an approach proven by the following telegram dated 9 April 1940: 
 
His Majesty’s Government […] are resolved to prevent Iceland from sharing the fate 
of Denmark and will take whatever action is necessary for this purpose.  Such action 
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may require that His Majesty’s Government should be given certain facilities in 
Iceland itself.
129
 
 
Reykjavík, however, declined: 
 
The Icelandic Government now, as before, highly appreciate and are grateful for the 
sympathy and friendship […] and for the interest […] [shown by] His Majesty’s 
Government.  […]  The position of Iceland is, however, that when […] [its] 
independence […] was recognised in 1918, […] permanent neutrality was declared.130 
 
This response was very frustrating and served only to increase tensions.
131
  Signifying, 
perhaps, a degree of desperation, London then requested, on 27 April 1940, that Reykjavík 
expel all German nationals, including Germany’s consul general, thus eliminating any risk of 
insurrection.
132
  Again, Reykjavík declined, prompting the Admiralty to commence 
preparations for Fork two days later.
133
  
Contrary to London’s belief, Iceland was at very little risk of invasion by Germany 
throughout the Second World War.
134
  It should not be assumed, however, that Berlin never 
considered doing so.
135
  As has been previously detailed, the German high command was 
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well aware of Iceland’s strategic importance.136  Consequently, Hitler ordered, both before 
and after Britain’s landing, that the island should fall under Nazi control.137  The name 
subsequently issued to this plan was Operation Fall Ikarus.
138
  Furthermore, ‘utopian 
schemes’139 for the invasion and occupation of other minor localities, such as the Canary 
archipelago and Cape Verde archipelago, existed.
140
  Each constituted part of Hitler’s end 
goal of possessing, writes Holger H. Herwig, ‘a solid belt of German holdings stretching 
from the Cameroons to the coast of East Africa, the return to Germany of South-West Africa, 
large areas of Morocco, and control of the Atlantic Islands’.141  Indeed, this ambition, 
unsurprisingly, led to a diagnosis of ‘island madness’142 – no doubt amongst other things – by 
his senior officers. 
In a letter from Rear Admiral Walter Ansel to Bittner, a brief sentence is included 
which sums up the peculiar mood that existed in both Berlin and London during 1940: ‘The 
Germans thought they could take anything and the British that anything might happen’.143  
Whilst very simplistic, this quote goes some way to explaining why the German high 
command believed that Hitler’s plan was feasible and also why the British high command 
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concurred.
144
  Neither belligerent, it would appear, appreciated the impracticalities.
145
  There 
were, however, certain individuals within the German high command who did, particularly 
those involved with Fall Ikarus: ‘An occupation of Iceland’,146 quotes Bittner from the War 
Diary of the German Naval Staff, ‘will not entail any improvement of the strategic situation 
[…] since the sea area around Iceland and between Iceland and the Faeroes is not controlled 
by German forces’.147  Consider, for a moment, these impracticalities.  The North Atlantic 
was infested by Royal Navy cruisers and Royal Navy auxiliary cruisers.
148
  Therefore, any 
German troopship headed for Iceland would have been at tremendous risk of interception 
and, due to the Kriegsmarine’s vastly inferior size, complete destruction.149  Parachute troops, 
too, were unfeasible as the Junkers Ju 52/3m had insufficient range to reach Iceland from 
Norway and return.
150
   
On 20 June 1940, more than five weeks after Britain’s landing, Fall Ikarus was 
discussed between Grand Admiral Eric Raeder and Hitler.
151
  They established together that, 
throughout the course of such an operation, it would be ‘impossible to maintain continuous 
supplies’152 and, more importantly, that the ‘entire navy would have to be used’.153  As a 
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result, Reader opposed any further development.
154
  This stance led, subsequently, to the 
shelving of Fall Ikarus.
155
  Hitler did not have the manpower to obtain and hold his projected 
borders, a deficiency that was made very clear: ‘The lack of an adequate fleet will constitute 
a continual drawback in the case of further expansion of the war, in the occupation, for 
example, the Cannery archipelago, the Cape Verde archipelago, the Azores, Dakar, [and] 
Iceland.’156   
Research on Iceland throughout the Second World War has always remained sparse.  
British, American and Canadian scholars, for reasons unknown, dedicate little time or effort 
to it.  Icelandic scholars, too, appear similarly disinterested.  Substantiating this latter point,  
Guðmundur Hálfdanarson writes:  
 
In the year 2000, the leading historical journal in Iceland, Saga […], ran a whole issue 
on the course of Icelandic twentieth-century historiography.  […]  Reading the twelve 
contributions, one is struck by the limited amount of attention Icelandic historians 
have paid to the Second World War and its role in Icelandic history.
157
 
 
During 2012, the perceived total of trustworthy secondary sources, written in English, with 
sections dedicated entirely to the subject, comprised two unpublished doctoral submissions – 
Bittner, D. F., ‘The British Occupation of Iceland, 1940-1942’ (unpublished PhD dissertation, 
University of Missouri, 1974); Whitehead, T., ‘Iceland in the Second World War, 1939-
1946’ (unpublished DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 1978) – two published books – 
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Bittner, D. F., The Lion and the White Falcon: Britain and Iceland in the World War II Era 
(Hamden: Archon Books, 1983); Chamberlin, W. C., Economic Development of Iceland 
through World War II (New York: AMS Press, 1968) – and three published journal articles – 
Bittner, D. F., ‘A Final Appraisal of the British Occupation of Iceland, 1940-1942’, The RUSI 
Journal, 120 (1975), 45-53; Bittner, D. F., ‘Canadian Militia Mobilization and Deployment 
for War: The Iceland Experience of 1940’, Armed Forces and Society, 18 (1992), 343-361; 
Hardarson, S. B. J., ‘The “Republic of Iceland” 1940-1944: Anglo-American Attitudes and 
Influences’, Journal of Contemporary History, 9 (1974), 27-56.  With the majority of these 
works being written by one particular scholar, Donald F. Bittner, the scope of documented 
research on the subject derives from a narrow range of sources which limits the diversity of 
interpretation within the historiography.  Compounding this, not all the research is readily 
available in the public domain.  As a result, only four works were utilised – the two books 
and the first and third journal articles listed above. 
This small collection of works is diverse in nature.  It comprises two general surveys 
– Bittner’s The Lion and the White Falcon and ‘A Final Appraisal of the British Occupation 
of Iceland’ – and two more specific works – Chamberlin’s Economic Development of Iceland 
through World War II and Hardarson’s ‘The “Republic of Iceland” 1940-1944’.  Each 
focuses their subject matter on various aspects of the events in Iceland throughout 1939-1945.  
Bittner’s The Lion and the White Falcon, published during 1983, is a comprehensive 
textbook on Anglo-Icelandic transactions throughout 1939-1945.  Bittner’s ‘A Final 
Appraisal of the British Occupation of Iceland’, published during 1975 in The RUSI Journal, 
is a comprehensive article that, because of its date of publication, subject matter and length, 
constitutes a detailed synopsis to The Lion and the White Falcon.  Chamberlin’s Economic 
Development of Iceland through World War II, published during 1968, is a valuable little 
textbook that discusses Iceland’s ascension throughout 1939-1945 out of fiscal depression 
21 
 
into relative prosperity. Hardarson’s ‘The “Republic of Iceland” 1940-1944’, published 
during 1974 in Journal of Contemporary History, is a lengthy article that discusses the affect 
of the British occupation on ‘Iceland’s last step towards complete independence’.158   
At a fundamental level, all four works address the theme of Britain’s actions in 
Iceland.  At a more detailed level, however, this theme is addressed from completely different 
standpoints.  Bittner’s works attempt to look at every aspect of Britain’s actions in Iceland, 
ranging from the actual invasion, the subsequent decisions that were made regarding the 
defence of Iceland and the appeasement of Iceland, the conduct of British troops in Iceland, 
and the decisions made that impacted on the internal running of Iceland.  Chamberlin’s work, 
by contrast, looks at Britain’s actions in Iceland from purely an economic point of view, 
discussing how the influx of troops brought money and infrastructure projects thus creating 
employment.  Hardarson’s work also limits the theme by only addressing the impact of 
Britain’s actions on Iceland’s attempts to declare itself as a republic. 
 An important point that arises through analysing all four works is that when the same 
subject matter is covered in the different sources, there is little disparity found in the 
information that is provided.  This suggests that such information is reliable.  For example, 
when Bittner discusses the effects that Britain’s construction programmes had on Iceland’s 
economy, his work, The Lion and the White Falcon, presents an almost identical set of facts 
as does Chamberlin in his more specialised work, Economic Development of Iceland through 
World War II, produced over a decade previously.  Indeed, the proof that Bittner did not 
utilise the passages from Chamberlin’s work lies within the endnotes – instead of citing 
Economic Development of Iceland through World War II, it cites a number of archival 
sources.
159
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All four works derive from ground breaking research.  Bittner’s works are adapted 
from his PhD dissertation, ‘The British Occupation of Iceland, 1940-1942’, whilst 
Chamberlin’s and Hardarson’s works are original pieces of research in themselves.  What 
they share in common is that none would appear to investigate, or seek to answer, any 
hypothesis or central question.  To all intents and purposes, they comprise, and thus render 
the historiography as, a collection of chronological narratives rather than a collection of 
analytical studies.  Indeed, this observation was also made by Hálfdanarson.
160
  
Consequently, there exists exciting opportunities for the historiography’s expansion, not just 
in size, but also in nature of content.  Where then shall this dissertation fit within?  Well, 
rather than contributing yet another chronological narrative, it shall offer a much needed 
analytical study, one that evaluates, for the first time, whether Britain, Iceland, America and 
Canada benefited from their actions/troubles.  With that in mind, this dissertation shall 
answer one specific question: to what extent did the British invasion and occupation of 
Iceland preserve Icelandic freedoms and secure Allied interests in Northern Europe? 
This dissertation comprises two chapters.  Chapter One covers proceedings 
throughout 10-19 May 1940, the period in which the Royal Marines invaded, consolidated 
and commenced the British occupation of Iceland.  It is also the period in which the British 
Army relieved the Royal Marines and assumed control.  The chapter will assess whether 
Operation Fork was a success and whether Iceland was secured from German invasion.  
Chapter Two, by contrast, covers proceedings throughout 20 May 1940-22 April 1942, the 
period in which the British Army, with assistance from the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, 
guarded Iceland from enemy belligerents.  The chapter will assess whether Iceland was 
reimbursed and rewarded for its trouble and whether the British occupation of Iceland was 
necessary for an Allied victory. 
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By contrast to the historiography, there exist a vast number of primary sources.  Some 
are original works – books or articles that have been written and published during, or close to, 
the events they detail.  Some are reproductions of original works – personal memoirs and 
diaries that have been edited and published during, close to, or far from the events they detail.  
Most, however, are unpublished archival sources; these can be found at The National 
Archives – formerly the Public Record Office – in Kew, Surrey. 
None of the published primary sources that fall within the first category were ever 
intended by their authors as histories.  Indeed, reasons for their publication were diverse.  An 
example of this can be found when analysing the following two.  Whilst Michael Bratby and 
Ernest Watkins’ Iceland Presents: An Assembly of Articles and Stories, published during c. 
1941, had been produced as a personal memento for those who served in Iceland, Leslie 
Roberts’ ‘They Never Had Seen a Soldier’, published during 1940 in The Saturday Evening 
Post, has obviously been written for a commercial publication.
161
  Consequently, the type of 
information that can be divulged from these sources will vary greatly.  Four diverse sources 
have been utilised in this dissertation, the two aforementioned publications, along with Philip 
Coggin’s The British Occupation of Iceland, published during 2009, and Eric Linklater’s The 
Northern Garrisons, published during 1941.  
Being a souvenir book, Bratby’s and Watkins’ Iceland Presents gives an interesting 
and sometimes artistic insight into the general mood of the British service personnel who 
served there.  This is because it comprises contributions – poems, articles, stories, transcripts 
from radio broadcasts and photographs – that have been produced by British service 
personnel themselves.  Written for commercial publication, Roberts’ ‘They Never Had Seen a 
Soldier’ provides an all-round article comprising some geographical contextualisation; 
analysis on the strategic importance of Iceland to North America, including the decision to 
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invade; an element of human-interest; and humorous stories on interaction between Icelandic 
civilians and Allied soldiers.  It stands today as an incredibly important piece of evidence.  
Canada’s contribution to the defence of Iceland has been, bar one journal article and one 
section of a book, largely overlooked in the historiography.
162
  Therefore, this first-hand 
account will prove invaluable to scholars until more research can be contributed.  Being a 
first-hand account written for commercial purposes, but one that failed to make publication at 
time of authorship, Coggin’s The British Occupation of Iceland is a work that holds the rare, 
if not unique, position of comprising personal testimony alongside complete transcriptions of 
public information leaflets and newspaper articles, with those of Icelandic origin having been 
translated.  As a result, it assists in providing an insight into personal perceptions of the time 
and can also be used as a repository for other sources no longer in existence or restricted due 
to language barriers.  Another work written for commercial publication, Eric Linklaters’ The 
Northern Garrisons, gives an interesting and unofficial perspective on life in Iceland, 
particularly for British soldiers throughout 1940-1942.   
Whilst the four publications listed above were contemporary to the time, three of 
these works promote the unwavering belief that Iceland was close to being invaded by 
Germany, emphasising the necessity for the British occupation.  Lesley Roberts, for example, 
writes that the invasion ‘is of major import to Canada’,163 giving various logical reasons for 
this.  This is a sentiment concurred by Linklater and Coggin, the former who writes: ‘The 
islands have served a strategic purpose of the highest importance.’164 Indeed, the common 
theme throughout these primary sources is the solid belief that the British occupation was the 
best action that could have been taken.  It could be argued that these publications constituted 
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works of propaganda.  By contrast, Bratby’s and Watkins’ contemporary work, Iceland 
Presents, is conspicuous by offering no opinion on this issue. 
The numerous archival sources come from a range of different governmental 
organisations: the Admiralty, the Air Ministry, the Foreign Office and the War Office.  
Documents that originate from the Admiralty will typically cover events that pertain to the 
Royal Navy in Iceland.  As the initial invasion of Iceland was conducted by the Royal 
Marines, and as the Royal Navy maintained a heavy presence in Iceland right up until 1945, 
many important and insightful documents exist, the most useful of which – including ADM 
202/50 and ADM 202/400 – are utilised within this dissertation.165  Documents that originate 
from the Air Ministry typically cover events that pertain to the Royal Air Force in Iceland.  
However, as the Royal Air Force aircraft that were initially stationed on Iceland answered to 
the British Army’s General Officer Commanding, many of the important documents that 
pertain to such matters actually can be found within War Office documentation.
166
  
Notwithstanding, Air Ministry documentation contain a plethora of information that should 
not be disregarded.  Documents that originate from the Foreign Office typically cover events 
that pertain to the British Legation in Iceland.  These are the most insightful of all the 
different types of archival sources; they constitute a barometer on relations between Icelandic 
civilians and British troops and between the Icelandic Government and British authorities on 
Iceland and, in effect, tell the story of the British invasion and occupation of Iceland.  The 
most useful individual items within these portfolios are the Annual Reviews on events in 
Iceland for each successive year.  Every event of importance is discussed and explained 
within these reviews which render them an excellent starting point from which to analyse 
proceedings.  Documents that originate from the War Office, by contrast to each of the 
aforementioned, will cover events that pertain to all aspects of the occupation, both military 
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and political.  This is because the British Army was so intrinsically linked with the everyday 
affairs of Iceland; indeed, Icelandic life would have to function around the requirements of 
the defending force, not vice versa.
167
  What is made apparent from all these unpublished 
archival sources is the desperation of the British situation throughout the early stages of the 
occupation.  United stances were being taken by British Army and Foreign Office 
representatives on the island pleading for greater equipment and more reinforcements.  The 
three military services each display within their documents a distinct level of alertness about 
their vulnerability on the island, with Foreign Office representatives paying particular 
attention to the exposed state that the islanders found themselves in.
168
   
In summary, this dissertation – entitled ‘The Uninvited Guests: Britain’s Military 
Forces in Iceland, 1940-1942’ – investigates the British invasion and occupation of Iceland, 
1940-1942, and seeks to answer one specific question: to what extent did the British invasion 
and occupation of Iceland preserve Icelandic freedoms and secure Allied interests in Northern 
Europe?  Chapter One covers proceedings throughout 10-19 May 1940; Chapter Two covers 
proceedings throughout 20 May 1940-22 April 1942.  Both focus their analysis on two 
themes, freedom preservation and security.  This dissertation shall be written using a wide 
variety of primary sources from The National Archives and secondary sources by Bittner, 
Chamberlin and Hardarson. 
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Figure One
169
 – A map of Iceland. 
 
 
Figure Two
170
 – A map of the Atlantic islands. 
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Figure Three
171
 – A diagram showing the course of Scandinavia’s ruling dynasties. 
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Chapter One: Invasion and Occupation, 10-19 May 1940 
When purely considering the sequence of events of Operation Fork and measuring the 
outcomes against its objectives, a scholar may well conclude that the enterprise had been 
conducted with total success.  Only with an in-depth analysis of the preparation of the 
enterprise and the force deployed can it be understood that the outcome was more a result of 
good fortune rather than careful planning and execution.  On 10 May 1940, 815 Marines from 
2
nd
 Royal Marine Battalion (hereafter 2RM), commanded by Colonel Robert Sturges, made 
landfall at Reykjavík, Iceland.
1
  Their objective was to secure Iceland from German 
invasion.
2
  It had been a dreadful crossing.
3
  Throughout, the Marines took up every square 
foot of available space lying ‘prostrate with sea-sickness’.4  So bad were conditions that, on 
arrival, many suffered from ‘considerable instability’.5  After disembarkation, however, a 
significant degree of recovery took place (see figures four and five).
6
  Whilst one company 
headed 154 miles north to secure Akureyri, Iceland’s second largest settlement, the rest 
proceeded with guides drafted from local British residents to secure key facilities in or near 
Reykjavík: the various communication offices, the wireless station, the police armoury, the 
German consulate, the proposed seaplane base at Vatnagarður, and the proposed landing 
grounds at Kaldaðarnes and Sandskeið.
7
  Very few setbacks occurred and no significant 
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opposition was met (see figure six).
8
  ‘The total damage’9 inflicted, writes F. M. Shepherd, 
amounted to ‘one broken door.’10  Accompanying 2RM on its mission was Charles Howard-
Smith, the newest and most senior addition to Britain’s legation in Iceland.11  He was 
travelling there as a minister – a senior diplomat ranking just below that of ambassador.12  
Once the surrounding area had been brought under British control, Howard-Smith 
disembarked and proceeded into Reykjavík for consultation with Iceland’s government (see 
figure seven).
13
  In addition to explaining London’s actions, he also had been instructed to 
issue a personal letter from King George VI as a token of Britain’s good intentions.14  After 
an exchange of platitudes, Howard-Smith presented his credentials and royal communiqué.
15
  
He stated that ‘British forces […] [had] landed in Iceland for the purpose of securing certain 
bases’16 and that, with these bases, British forces ‘could prevent the war [from] coming near 
Iceland.’17  He also made clear his view on Iceland’s situation: ‘Neutrality is an unenviable 
state, but it can be maintained if force is there to protect it.’18  Finally, Howard-Smith inferred 
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that there would be financial compensation for Iceland’s trouble.19  Reaction, whilst 
somewhat sombre, was far friendlier than anticipated.
20
  The Prime Minister, Hermann 
Jónasson, replied that ‘the Icelandic government for their part did not believe that the 
Germans would make a descent upon the island, but as […] [the British] had come in a spirit 
of good will, they would co-operate’21 (see figure eight).  The following analysis shall 
address three key themes with an intention to demonstrate how and why the aforementioned 
sequence of events misrepresents Fork as a triumph.  Firstly, it shall measure Fork’s 
outcomes against its objectives; secondly, it shall establish Fork’s quality of preparation, 
focusing on organisation and composition of force; and thirdly, it shall establish the 
opposition forces that were predicted to be confronted.  The analysis shall show that Fork 
was liable to fail with the slightest of opposition.  In all, the analysis shall demonstrate that, 
for the duration of Fork, Icelandic freedoms were not been preserved and Allied interests not 
secured. 
Whilst researching the aforementioned sequence of events, scholars can be forgiven 
for initially believing that Operation Fork was very successful.  After all, every major 
objective issued to Colonel Sturges had been accomplished: firstly, ‘to use such force as […] 
necessary to obtain control of the Island’;22 secondly, ‘to ensure that resident enemy aliens 
[…] or persons acting on behalf of or assisting the enemy […] be arrested or put under 
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effective control’;23 thirdly ‘to make defensive arrangements […] to prevent the Germans 
from occupying Reykjavík’;24 fourthly, ‘to obtain the co-operation of local [police] forces’;25 
and fifthly, ‘to cultivate friendly relations with the authorities and community at large’.26  As 
has already been detailed, only modest force was required for Britain to impose its authority 
over Iceland; the general population and government succumbed without any resistance.  
Success in those latter four objectives, however, remains to be analysed.   
When 2RM made landfall, enemy prisoners were swiftly taken.
27
  Many, including 
the German consul general, Dr Werner Gerlach, were captured immediately (see figures nine 
and ten).
28
  On that first day, Iceland’s contingent of German nationals had, as instructed by 
senior Admiralty personnel, largely been rounded up and transferred via the Royal Navy to 
various internment camps in Britain.
29
  Several individuals, however, evaded arrest and hid 
for months – one even hid for a year – before being apprehended.30 
From the moment 2RM had gained effective control of Iceland, defence plans for 
Reykjavík were prepared.  When finalised on 14 May 1940, four days later, they fully 
incorporated every available resource.
31
  Indeed, the defence plans make chilling reading and 
highlight just how difficult 2RM’s strategic situation was.  It had been decided that 
Germany’s most likely methods of attack would be, either, by deploying aircraft to land 
troops at airfields near Reykjavík, by deploying aircraft to drop parachute troops near or over 
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Reykjavík, by deploying boats to land troops at Reykjavík harbour, or by deploying boats to 
land troops far from Reykjavík where a base could be established.
32
  It had also been 
suggested, and expected, that all four aforementioned methods would be utilised together.
33
  
In addition, there was significant concern as to the nature of Germany’s tactics during an 
airborne assault; it was feared that, in a bid to confuse the British defenders, the Germans 
would descend wearing civilian clothes or British Battle Dress.
34
  Therefore, Colonel Sturges 
ordered for particularly harsh penalties – not dissimilar from those in operation throughout 
Britain – for dealing with such opponents: ‘They are to be shot during [the] decent and on 
[the] ground.  If wearing civilian clothes or British Battle Dress, […] [they should] not […] 
be captured but shot forthwith.’35 
The fourth objective was accomplished despite considerable effort by Agnar Kofoed-
Hansen, Iceland’s Chief of Police, to bring about more a negative outcome.  Kofoed-Hansen 
was a suspected Nazi sympathiser; he had been a guest of Heinrich Himmler whilst on a tour 
of police training centres in Germany.
36
  Both 2RM’s war diarist and Colonel Sturges recount 
numerous examples throughout 10-19 May 1940 where Kofoed-Hansen became either 
deliberately uncooperative or suspiciously deceptive during his dealings with Marine 
personnel.
37
  Notwithstanding, a basic working relationship – no doubt facilitated through 
successful completion of the fifth and final objective – was established with Icelandic police, 
                                                             
32
 The National Archives, ADM 202/50, ‘Operation Order No. 2’, 12 May 1940, p. 1. 
 
33
 Ibid. 
 
34
 Ibid. 
 
35
 Ibid.  For details as to British policy on dealing with German parachute troops over the United Kingdom, see 
N. R. Storey, The Home Guard (Botley: Shire Publications, 2009), pp. 6-7. 
 
36
 The National Archives, ADM 202/50, War Diary entry, 11 May 1940 and Bittner, The Lion and the White 
Falcon, p. 44. 
 
37
 The National Archives, ADM 202/50, War Diary entry, 11 May 1940 and The National Archives, ADM 
202/400, ‘Letter of Proceedings’, 27 May 1940, p. 3. 
34 
 
one that can be demonstrated by some recorded incidents of Icelanders being arrested for 
deliberately harassing and/or assaulting on-duty Marines.
38
 
Positive relations developed quickly between both the British and the Icelandic 
authorities which subsequently enhanced everybody’s ability to co-operate with each other.  
Nowhere are these sentiments better demonstrated than through a firsthand account written 
by Howard-Smith.
39
  Within this account, he reveals how deeply touched Jónasson was by 
the sentiments expressed in King George VI’s letter and, more importantly, that ‘friendly and 
informal talk on general subjects’40 had been facilitated. 
Other factors that might make Operation Fork appear successful include, firstly, the 
fact no casualties – bar one suicide committed onboard ship by a Marine on 10 May 1940 – 
were either sustained or inflicted, and secondly, the substantial quantity of enemy intelligence 
gathered.
41
  When 2RM made landfall, one of its first and most important objectives, as has 
already been detailed, was to seize Gerlach’s residence/office (see figure eleven).  Colonel 
Sturges suspected that many sensitive documents were being contained within.
42
  He could 
not, it transpired, have been more correct.  On arrival, whilst Gerlach tried to stall for time, 
his wife and daughters attempted to burn sensitive documents in their bathtub.
43
  Fortunately, 
the Marines had foreseen this eventuality and thus equipped themselves with fire 
extinguishers, which they used.
44
  Although many sensitive documents were destroyed, over 
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half survived.
45
  Some, it should be noted, contained disturbing information which confirmed 
London’s suspicions that Berlin intended to take control (see figure twelve).46  As a result, 
the British invasion and occupation of Iceland had, albeit through British eyes, been justified.  
These actions, for all their positive results, do not put across the bigger picture that is 
Operation Fork.  They constitute a positive veneer of shining successes that hide what was, 
ultimately, an inherently flawed enterprise.  It would be very wrong to suggest that Fork 
preserved Icelandic freedoms and secured Allied interests in Northern Europe.  There are, as 
shall now be detailed, two reasons for this unpleasant truth.   
Firstly, and most obviously, Fork flagrantly breached Iceland’s neutrality.47  No 
political spin could disguise this fact.  Since inception of the 1918 Dano-Icelandic Act of 
Union, Iceland had maintained a state of splendid isolation where pacifism, along with 
independence, was fiercely upheld.
48
  Its people wanted to be left alone, as was their right.
49
  
Secondly, and most importantly, Fork, whilst forged from righteous intentions, was poorly 
prepared.  Had events transpired differently, had German forces descended on Iceland during 
10-19 May 1940, its outcome would certainly have been disastrous.  Indeed, hundreds of 
dead and/or captured Marines and Icelanders is not an unrealistic prediction. 
The first facet of Fork which failed to reach a war winning standard was organisation.  
Whilst this issue could not have been averted – threats posed from German descent, as has 
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already been demonstrated, were only fully appreciated just days before countermeasures 
were implemented – any fallout that resulted should nevertheless be taken into consideration.   
When Colonel Sturges commenced his journey to take command of 2RM at 
Greenock, he had no idea where, or in what situation, they would end up.
50
  This information, 
reveals Bittner, was made clearer at Euston Railway Station, the place Colonel Sturges 
received his orders in writing.
51
  Major Humphrey Quill, commanding officer of a small 
intelligence detachment, fared no better.
52
  He and his men had two hours with which to halt 
their work on Far Eastern matters and to prepare themselves for disembarkation and fresh 
assignments alongside 2RM.
53
  Under ideal circumstances, the British military would have 
provided as much notice as possible for its senior officers before they undertook an 
operational command.
54
  Unfortunately, throughout ‘crisis and wartime’,55 writes Bob 
Bushaway, ‘this [utopian scenario] was rarely possible’.56  Situations such as that experienced 
by Colonel Sturges and Major Quill ‘would not have been unusual’.57  After all, quick 
decision making was a facility expected of all officers.
58
  Having said that, and as shall be 
detailed in due course, no one could deny the benefits Colonel Sturges and Major Quill would 
have gained had they received an extra 24 hours. 
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Intelligence, writes John Patrick Finnegan, is ‘the collection of information by 
commanders on the enemy and the battlefield environment they must confront’.59  
Unfortunately for Colonel Sturges, nobody in Major Quill’s detachment, including Major 
Quill himself, spoke either German or Icelandic, so it was absolutely impossible for Colonel 
Sturges to obtain intelligence that was guaranteed to be impartial or completely trustworthy.
60
  
Carl von Clausewitz, in his definitive work On War, comments on this very issue: ‘What is 
required of an officer [to distinguish legitimate intelligence from illegitimate intelligence] is a 
certain power of discrimination, which only knowledge of men and things and good 
judgement can give.’61  No knowledge of German or Icelandic would have rendered much of 
2RM’s intelligence as useless or open to misinterpretation. 
Whilst at sea, Colonel Sturges held a conference onboard HMS Berwick.
62
  During 
this conference, which was attended only by officers, 2RM’s destination, mission and plan of 
attack were established.
63
  This conference also served as an opportunity to evaluate what 
intelligence had already been assembled.  The amount, it transpired, was very little; only 
three maps – one of Iceland, one of the Reykjavík area, and one of Reykjavík itself – could be 
found.
64
  These master copies had to be duplicated by each platoon commander.  
Furthermore, making matters worse, the latter map, the one of Reykjavík itself, had been 
drawn from memory.
65
  As a result, due to its inaccuracies, considerable ‘confusion’66 arose 
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‘among companies on landing.’67  Quite why senior Admiralty personnel ordered 2RM into 
battle with just three maps, for that is what effectively happened, remains unclear.  None of 
the sources, both primary and secondary, are able to provide an answer.  It probably resulted 
from insufficient preparation time.  
On top of all hitherto mentioned difficulties, as if proceedings could not get any 
worse, 2RM was late sailing.
68
 This delay had been attributed to three reasons: the tardy 
arrival of certain unspecified supplies, the lack of dock space and loading facilities, and a 
shortage of, what is perceived be, lighters, misspelt in Colonel Sturges’ report as ‘lighhers’.69  
Demonstrating, perhaps, 2RM’s desperation, any supplies that remained unloaded by 03:00 
on 8 May 1940 were discarded forthwith: ‘What was left ashore at this time’,70 wrote Colonel 
Sturges, ‘was unknown but in view of the […] [desired] time of arrival at REYKJAVIK, it 
was decided to sail with the stores which were on board and hope that no essentials were left 
on shore.’71 
The second facet of Fork which failed to reach a war winning standard was the 
composition of the force itself.  On a scale of one to ten, with ten representing effective and 
one representing ineffective, 2RM should score somewhere between one and four.  It was a 
force, still in development, a force at point of deployment, wholly unprepared. 
Whilst the senior officers and senior non-commissioned officers of 2RM were veteran 
servicemen, the main body of soldiers – the junior officers, junior non-commissioned officers 
and Marines – were new recruits.72  If these new recruits had been fully trained, knowledge 
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gained through lessons in military theory and through practice manoeuvres would, 
undoubtedly, have partly offset a lack in experience of real-time combat situations.  
Unfortunately, these new recruits, as shall now be detailed, had not been fully trained.
73
  Prior 
to embarkation, 2RM’s activities focussed predominantly on physical conditioning, 
improving discipline, and installing a small amount of tactical knowledge.
74
  Therefore, none 
of the Marines had qualified with either the Lee Enfield bolt-action rifle or Bren light 
machine gun.
75
  To make matters worse, fifty Marines had never even fired a weapon.
76
  This 
issue was attributed, predominantly, to a lack of available firing ranges on which the Marines 
could practice.
77
  In laconic fashion, the whole disastrous situation is summarised by 2RM’s 
war diarist: ‘The men are only partially trained.  There were no war stores and there was a 
shortage of weapons.’78 
Whilst at sea, weapons were finally issued to every soldier in 2RM.
79
  These weapons 
– Lee Enfields, the British military’s principle bolt-action rifle; Brens, the British military’s 
principle light machine gun; anti-tank rifles; and 2” mortars – were brand-new and 
completely un-calibrated.
80
  Consequently, not only would the Marines have just forty-eight 
hours to familiarise themselves with these previously unused weapons, they would also have 
to calibrate and fine-tune them, practise operating them and make-ready them for use in anger 
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immediately on landing.
81
  Needless to say, a cramped and crowded ship is not the most 
suitable place to be making such hasty preparations.  In addition, 2RM, having only been 
activated during April 1940, was required on its voyage to learn how to operate as a cohesive 
unit; this method of working would be critical when facing potentially hostile Icelanders and, 
more importantly, German forces.
82
 
It was not only 2RM’s handheld weapons that were unprepared for combat, its heavy 
support weapons possessed similar issues.  To help win against an expected German attack – 
one which, as shall soon be detailed, appeared insurmountable – a collective of artillery 
pieces – two 3.7 inch howitzers, each with 100 rounds of ammunition; four 2 pdr. pom pom 
anti-aircraft guns, each with 2000 rounds of ammunition per barrel; and two 4 inch coastal 
defence guns, each with 150 rounds of ammunition – accompanied the Marines.83  Whilst 
Roberts does make reference to these in his article on Fork, he does not make reference to 
their ineffectiveness, a state brought about by a lack of communications equipment, a lack of 
searchlights and a lack of directors.
84
  In addition, compounding this unfortunate situation 
further, the artillerymen charged with manning and operating 2RM’s howitzers, pom poms 
and coastal defence guns had, for reasons unknown, never shot them.
85
  Moreover, nobody 
could be sure if any would in fact work.
86
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So, in summary, 2RM consisted predominantly of young, inexperienced and untrained 
Marines.  None of these Marines had qualified with their designated weapons; fifty had never 
even fired a weapon.  2RM’s artillerymen were particularly unfit to wage war; they were few 
in number, short of ammunition and had never even operated the type of guns allocated for 
their mission.  Thus far, through unbiased analysis, this dissertation has established and 
examined the events that transpired on 10 May 1940, the state of preparedness of Operation 
Fork, and the standard and quality of 2RM.  A change in approach, however, ensues.   
Whilst Iceland, when compared with other theatres of conflict during the Second 
World War, represents an unusually bloodless and non-destructive one, it should be noted 
that such an outcome had not been expected, particularly before or during the initial days, 
weeks and months.  As a result, this dissertation shall now establish and examine the 
opposition forces 2RM was thought most likely to confront. 
There were two phases to Fork’s potential body of conflict.  The first phase would 
have occurred on the day of the invasion, 10 May 1940, and would have comprised of a 
British attack against an Icelandic and German defence.
87
  As has already been detailed, 
following a lengthy disarmament programme, Iceland was, by the twentieth century, 
generally averse to military hardware.  This mind set, however, did not spread to its small but 
well equipped police force; its seventy officers were heavily armed with rifles, revolvers and 
tear gas.
88
  Whilst Colonel Sturges and other senior Admiralty personnel thought that fighting 
would not break out against Chief of Police Kofoed-Hansen and his officers – ‘it is believed 
they are not in a position to put up any resistance’,89 wrote an anonymous person – this 
eventuality could not, unfortunately, be ruled out: ‘It will be necessary to land in the face of 
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the ill will of the Govt. and possible opposition of such forces as they can bring against us’.90  
After all, as has already been detailed, Kofoed-Hansen was a suspected Nazi sympathiser, his 
officers were armed, and all Icelanders were fiercely independent.  Simultaneously, the 
German residents, who by 1940 numbered approximately 200, were also thought capable of 
staging some form of armed resistance.
91
  There was, however, less certainty as to this 
likelihood: ‘We do not know’,92 continued the aforementioned person, ‘what arms […] [they 
might] have.’93   
The second phase would have occurred during the ensuing days following the 
invasion, 11-19 May 1940, and would have comprised of a German attack against a British 
defence.  This engagement was not only predicted to occur, it was predicted to occur on a 
scale, arguably, hitherto unseen during this most recent spate of Anglo-German hostilities: 
 
[Whilst at sea, it was made known] that German troop-carrying aircraft and […] 
[parachute troops] were likely to arrive after the Germans had heard of our landing 
and that a force of 50,000 Germans was waterborne on the River Elbe ready to move 
– possibly to Iceland.94 
 
After analysing the Icelandic police and the German residents, reason would suggest 
that the first phase would not have prevented 2RM from, firstly, making a successful landing 
on Iceland, and secondly, establishing its authority over local residents.  Granted, 2RM was 
untrained and in possession of some potentially sub-standard equipment.  Its prospective 
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opponents, however, were deficient in strength.  Ultimately, sheer weight of numbers would 
have facilitated 2RM in prevailing over any and every group that posed a threat.  Only one 
question remains: at what cost?  There is no information in both the primary and secondary 
sources that directly details, or alludes to, the competency of the Icelandic police.  Its officers 
may have been highly unfamiliar with their weapons; alternatively, of course, they may have 
been highly proficient with them.  As has already been detailed, Kofoed-Hansen visited 
Germany to observe police training methods.  This knowledge would suggest that he was at 
least keen to field an effective contingent of officers.  All things considered – leadership, 
armament, psyche and training – it remains a distinct possibility that, had every officer made 
a stand, the Icelandic police would have inflicted 2RM with seriously a bloody nose.  There is 
also no information in both the primary and secondary sources that directly details, or alludes 
to, the competency of the German residents.  Whilst most were civilians with little or no 
military experience, sixty-two were shipwrecked sailors from the Bahia Blanca, a merchant 
ship that sank after hitting an iceberg on 10 January 1940.
95
  Had these men been armed and 
had they fought in coalition with, or separately to, the Icelandic police, they would also likely 
have caused 2RM some notable damage. 
Whereas the first phase would have presented 2RM with a challenging opponent, one 
that could, arguably, only be overcome through loss of life, the second phase would have 
presented 2RM with an undefeatable opponent, a substantial force that could easily have 
crushed 2RM and fulfilled Hitler’s prophecy: ‘[The Führer stated that] within ten days’,96 
writes Robert Bruce Lockhart, ‘not a single British soldier would be left in Iceland.’97  Unlike 
the Icelandic police and the German residents, there is plenty of information in both the 
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primary and secondary sources that directly details, or alludes to, the competency of the 
German army.  It makes chilling reading.  Firstly, at a most elementary level, the German 
army was in excellent physical condition.
98
  This feature and its implications had been 
studied and made all too aware within British military circles: 
 
Germany believes that a reason for failure in the last war was that her soldiers were 
not physically as fit as the British soldiers.  Even before the advent of the Nazi regime 
a nation-wide scheme of physical training was inaugurated; all youths were graded 
accorded to the standards they reached.  The Nazis made membership of the Hitler 
youth compulsory.  In this organization physical training and marching became 
compulsory.  After passing through the Hitler youth a boy joins the Labour Service 
where physical fitness, marching, and all form of outdoor exercises were carried out.  
Thus we are now faced by fighting forces composed of supremely fit men who have 
been trained to undergo great physical strain.  Any shortage of food or under-
nourishment is to a large extent offset by this.
99
 
 
Whilst this appraisal might seem a little sensationalistic and at risk of portraying Germany’s 
soldiers as superhuman, which they of course were not, its fundamental point is nonetheless 
credible.  Wehrmacht personnel were physically strong, an attribute which allowed them, 
with the right training, to operate under strenuous conditions.
100
  Secondly, the German army 
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had an arsenal of innovative, deadly and, strictly speaking, illegal weapons.
101
  Prior to 
achieving power, before 1933, plans for an intensive programme of rearmament had taken up 
a significant part of the Nazi’s military policy.102  On achieving power, these plans were put 
into effect.
103
  ‘Coming at a time when other countries were more inclined to reduce their 
military expenditures’,104 writes Gerhard L. Weinberg, ‘the German armament programme 
would change the balance of currently available military power’.105  This programme was 
initially undertaken in secret; Hitler did not want his nation to be suspected of breaking any 
restrictions imposed on it at Versailles.
106
  As war loomed closer, however, developments in 
air, armoured and chemical warfare; the expansion of the Kriegsmarine; the creation of the 
Luftwaffe; and conscription, could no longer be concealed.
107
  Essentially, writes David 
Stone, ‘the German army that went to war in 1939 was indeed “an army such as the world 
had never seen” (to quote Hitler), with soldiers who were thoroughly trained, well motivated, 
physically robust, well managed and justifiably confident both in themselves and their 
national leaders’108 – a near complete opposite of 2RM.  
When considering the above essential points, it is clear that the British invasion and 
the first nineteen days of occupation did very little, if anything, to preserve Icelandic 
freedoms and secure Allied interests in Northern Europe.  Fork flagrantly breached Iceland’s 
neutrality; it embroiled Iceland into a war that could have been avoided.  It put Iceland at 
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tremendous risk of invasion by Germany.  If Britain wanted aspects of its military to be 
stationed in Iceland, despite the potential consequences, it had an obligation to send a 
preliminary force that had received adequate training and equipment.  By orchestrating 
Operation Fork as described and by sending the ill prepared 2RM, this obligation was not 
met. Operation Fork had been poorly prepared, rendering it liable to fail with the slightest of 
opposition.  2RM was in a very poor state; it was poorly trained and poorly equipped.  Most 
importantly, the opponents that 2RM had been predicted to face were by far superior in 
strength of numbers and fire power.  Ultimately, if 2RM’s purpose was to improve Britain’s 
security by preventing a German invasion of Iceland, its very presence in Iceland risked 
provoking a German invasion. After all, the fact that Britain was motivated enough to station 
a force in Iceland was the ultimate demonstration of its strategic importance. A fundamental 
review of policy would be required to achieve long term security. 
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Figure Four
109
 – ‘Reykjavík was sighted during a brief snowstorm, well lit up.  The troops had been fallen in for 
some time, considerable unsteadiness was evident owing to sea-sickness’.110 
 
 
Figure Five
111
 – ‘HMS Fearless came alongside but little or no provision had been made for transferring the 
troops quickly, the gangways were narrow, slippery for a fully equipped man, and totally insufficient in 
number.’112 
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Figure Six
113
 – ‘Dour Icelandic men and their handsome women lined the quayside to watch the first landing of 
troops since the first settlers arrived, almost eleven centuries ago.  No demonstration occurred, either of 
welcome or of displeasure.’114 
 
 
Figure Severn
115
 – ‘At 11:00, I [(front left)] proceeded to the Government building accompanied by Mr. 
Shepherd [(front right)], Mr. Harris [(back right)], and Mr. Fortescue [(hidden from view)].’116 
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Figure Eight
117
 – ‘The Ministers listened to my statement attentively, and at its conclusion the Prime Minister 
[(centre)] replied briefly to the effect that the Icelandic Government must maintain the attitude they had adopted 
in April.  Whatever His Majesty’s Government might think, they for their part did not believe that the Germans 
would have made a descent upon the island.’118 
 
 
Figure Nine
119
 – ‘He is a very nice man to talk to, most polite, and very interested in Iceland and Icelandic 
affaires.’120 
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Figure Ten
121
 – ‘The Germans are taken out to a waiting car.  There is a small crowed outside.  Sentries 
surround the house.  The German staff is driven away.’122 
 
 
Figure Eleven
123
 – ‘A British soldier unscrews the scarlet plate with the black swastika and takes it down.’124 
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Figure Twelve
125
 – ‘Our second night was spent in the German consulate, where we had to go through endless 
papers.  Signed photographs of Himmler, Goebbels, and Göering looked down on us.’126 
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Chapter Two: Occupation, 20 May 1940-22 April 1942 
Where Operation Fork failed to preserve Icelandic freedoms and secure Allied 
interests in Northern Europe, the wider course of the European conflict would lead to a 
fundamental change in British policy towards Iceland, reversing this outcome.  On 20 May 
1940, nineteen days after invading and occupying Iceland, 2
nd
 Royal Marine Battalion was 
relieved by 147
th
 Infantry Brigade (hereafter Alabaster).
1
  Like its predecessor, Alabaster was 
severely underequipped and in no position to defend a whole county.
2
  Indeed, all calls for 
sufficient reinforcements had fallen on deaf ears whilst events in mainland Europe spiralled 
out of control.
3
  On 23 May 1940, Field Marshal Alan Brooke, 1
st
 Viscount Alanbrooke, 
wrote a sombre entry into his diary: ‘Nothing […] can save the BEF now’.4  Indicative, 
perhaps, of Iceland’s secondary importance up until this point, Edward Wood, 1st Earl of 
Halifax and Britain’s Foreign Minister, enquired during a cabinet meeting whether ‘it would 
[…] be better to withdraw at once, while there is yet time, a force which appears to be 
ineffective’.5  This proposal, however, was strongly rebuffed.6  With France’s eventual 
capitulation, Britain found itself surrounded on three sides.
7
  Whilst hostile German forces 
occupied Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and northern France, neutral Irish 
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forces occupied southern Ireland.
8
  This difficult situation required Britain to adopt a new 
policy towards Iceland, one that would strengthen its defences there.
9
  Major General H. L. 
Davis explains why: 
 
German seizure of Iceland would have closed the North-west Approaches just as 
effectively as their seizure of France had done to the South-western Approach.  The 
result would have been the forced capitulation of Britain due to starvation within a 
very brief time.
10
 
 
Senior military personnel quickly appreciated the strategic importance of Iceland.
11
  As a 
result, they dramatically increased Britain’s military presence and investment in military 
infrastructure.
12
  The following analysis shall ascertain the results of this inward investment, 
both the positive and negative outcomes.  It shall also analyse the social and political 
relationships that grew between both parties.  The analysis shall start from an Icelandic 
perspective and shall finish on a British perspective.  It shall demonstrate that, once the initial 
question of island security had been addressed, mutual benefit was predominant and easily 
obtainable.  It shall also demonstrate that Anglo-Icelandic relations remained cordial despite 
disagreements on conduct.  In all, the analysis shall demonstrate that, throughout 20 May 
1940-22 April 1942, Icelandic freedoms were largely preserved and Allied interests were 
completely secured. 
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It had been long held within the Foreign Office that the Icelander was more 
influenced by consideration for his or her pocket than by anything else.
13
  Whilst undeniably 
shocking, this documented view depicts, rather unsympathetically, a genuine state of affairs.  
Iceland had been experiencing, over several successive years, serious and prolonged 
economic difficulties.
14
  The fishing catches had been appalling – a problem first perceived 
during 1934 – and, compounding matters further, the best markets had been lost.15  Money 
was very tight.
16
  Therefore, to induce co-operation, Whitehall proposed that Britain should 
accept all of Iceland’s exports – predominantly fish, contributing approximately 90%, meat 
and wool.
17
  Whilst this gesture may seem generous, it represents, in reality, nothing more or 
less than a mutually beneficial deal, if not a moral obligation.  By invading, Britain had 
severed Iceland from many of its European trading partners; terrible consequences would 
befall the island, similar to those experienced throughout 1807-1810, if these losses were not 
offset.
18
 
When Alabaster arrived on 19 May 1940, so did numerous employment opportunities.  
‘The forces, having much work to be done,’19 writes William Charles Chamberlin, ‘offered 
high wages in order to secure the requisite labour.’20  As shall now be detailed, there was a 
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very important reason for this decision.  In addition to defending Iceland, Alabaster had been 
charged with developing air and naval bases at several key locations.
21
  These bases, 
including the necessary infrastructure such as roads, bridges, accommodation blocks and 
mess halls, required constructing.  Therefore, to ensure individual projects would be 
delivered on time, a mass recruitment programme, one targeted at Iceland’s unemployed, was 
instigated (see figure thirteen).
22
  This influx of employment opportunities produced a very 
positive result; after February 1941, the Althing ceased publication of its monthly 
unemployment report.
23
  Indeed, such projects not only provided Icelanders with highly paid 
and regular work, they also provided, writes Chamberlin, ‘capital improvements’24 – public 
facilities were either created or upgraded.  This mass mobilisation, however, caused a labour 
shortage throughout 1941; too much, it would appear, was being attempted.
25
  Strikes over 
wages that had not tracked inflation rates also caused some problems.
26
  Consequently, 
during May that year, the military authorities, following suggestions made by the Althing, 
recruited 250 men from the Faroe archipelago, a collection of impoverished Danish islands 
under British protection situated between Iceland and Norway.
27
   
The requirement of the British military to pay for services crucial to its occupation 
represents another area where the Icelandic economy grew throughout 1940-1942.  This 
situation arose because the Icelandic government, in a bid to maintain its neutrality, made 
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sure that no state sponsored assistance of any kind was made available – payment for use of 
island facilities would be negotiated between the occupiers and the respective companies 
responsible.
28
  What is more, no alternative option, other than acquiring these services 
through force, presented itself.  Whilst payment for use of Reykjavík harbour by Royal Navy 
warships represents one good example, payment for use of Iceland’s telephone system – the 
principle method of quick communication – represents another, better example.29  When a 
relatively small force, such as Alabaster, guards a relatively large island, such as Iceland, its 
commander cannot guarantee that sufficient troops have been deployed throughout every 
district in order to repel an invasion; the force will be weak and thinly spread, albeit 
entrenched.
30
  Therefore, reliable lines of communication – telegraphy, telephony and radio, 
for example – become vitally important; they ensure that, should enemy units attack, 
reinforcements can be summoned with haste.
31
  On Iceland, Alabaster did not possess reliable 
lines of communication in great numbers, so it utilised the island’s domestic telephone 
service – at a cost.32  To this end, if coastal lookout stations witnessed anything suspicious, 
their reports would be charged at normal commercial rates.
33
 
There were other benefits that Iceland gained from its period of occupation, and 
whilst they, arguably, did not possess any economic value, they did possess some practical 
application.  These benefits resulted from, what can only be described as, sustained social 
investment, i.e. goodwill gestures.  The University of Iceland (hereafter UoI) had, during 
1940, completed a new building in Reykjavík, one that could utilise fossil fuel to generate 
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warmth.
34
  This method, however, was prohibitively expensive; coal prices, for example, 
hovered on or just below 150 krónur per ton.
35
  Consequently, in response to considerable 
budgetary restraints, UoI had, simultaneously, devised a new and far more cost-effective 
central heating system, one that would utilise naturally occurring steam from local volcanic 
springs.
36
  Such phenomena, it turns out, can be found all over Iceland.
37
  To complete this 
latter project, an order for some specially designed pipes had been placed in Germany.
38
  
Unfortunately, following Iceland’s unplanned entry into hostilities, all hitherto unfulfilled 
orders associated with Axis powers, including the pipes, were rendered unobtainable.  They 
sat on transport ships, built, but unable to leave.
39
  This complication produced a very serious 
issue for UoI; hard economic times had made financing enough coal for one year impossible, 
rendering the building unusable.
40
  Cold weather too, was not far away.  Therefore, whilst 
diplomatic efforts to secure these pipes, spearheaded by Charles Howard-Smith, got 
underway, the Admiralty donated 250-300 tons of coal from its Reykjavík depot, enough for 
one calendar year.
41
  Further examples of social investment were both diverse and numerous.  
These included the provision of public, and often free, entertainment events for all Icelanders, 
the provision of Christmas parties and gifts for all Icelandic children, and the flying of 
                                                             
34
 The National Archives, ADM 199/699, Howard-Smith to Collier, 19 June 1940. 
 
35
 Ibid. 
 
36
 Ibid., minute by Waldash, 4 June 1940. 
 
37
 W. R. Mead, ‘Renaissance of Iceland’, Economic Geography, 21 (1945), p. 140. 
 
38
 The National Archives, ADM 199/699, minute by Waldash, 4 June 1940. 
 
39
 Ibid. 
 
40
 The National Archives, ADM 199/699, Howard-Smith to Collier, 19 June 1940. 
 
41
 Whilst not directly confirmed, it would appear from the primary sources within sub-folder M012785/40 of 
ADM 199/699 that such an outcome did occur.  Indeed, both the Foreign Office and Admiralty were keen 
advocates, demonstrating so during various telegrams and minutes dated 19 June and 30 July 1940 and 4, 9, 12, 
and 15 July 1940 respectively.  On 13 August 1940, senior Treasury personnel refused to ‘sanction [a] free gift’ 
but instead agreed that 250-300 tons of coal could be provided from Admiralty stocks at two pounds sterling per 
ton.  This cost was presumably borne by either the Foreign Office or Admiralty, totalling no more than 600 
pounds sterling.  Bittner, in The Lion and the White Falcon, p. 93, interprets events similarly. 
58 
 
Iceland’s national flag on public military parades.42  Such actions were very important.  
Firstly, they benefited the Icelanders materially, and secondly, they demonstrated that their 
occupiers cared for them.
43
 
Moving on from the material benefits gained, there were other aspects of Britain’s 
conduct in Iceland that neither enriched nor depleted life for the local inhabitants; these 
aspects would help to preserve the status quo.  Before Alabaster relieved 2
nd
 Royal Marine 
Battalion, each soldier was issued with a leaflet entitled ‘Ten Commandments for British 
Troops in Iceland’44 (see appendix).  This leaflet set out the parameters of Alabaster’s 
behaviour, the dos and don’ts of each serving individual.  ‘Don’t forget’,45 stated 
commandment one, ‘that this is the first time that British troops have landed in Iceland: we 
represent the British Empire and it is by our behaviour, discipline, and bearing that the British 
will be judged.’46  It was an all encompassing collection of guidelines, the soldiers were told 
to respect the Icelandic residences that they would be temporally billeted in; to learn about 
the Icelanders before judging them; to conduct themselves in a far more polite manner than 
usual; to treat the Icelandic women as they would like their own wives or sisters to be treated; 
to guard against boredom; to continually learn new routines, jobs and skills; to keep all 
military information secret; to learn Icelandic and to teach English; and to never, ever 
scavenge: ‘it is most unpopular with foreigners.’47  Evidently, a positive image was sought. 
There are two reasons the Icelanders did not experience deterioration in their quality 
of life.  Firstly, minimal force was utilised against them.  This policy, introduced by Colonel 
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Robert Sturges on 10 May 1940, originally stipulated that 2
nd
 Royal Marine Battalion could 
commence firing only once a set number of casualties had been sustained, the number of 
which is not disclosed.
48
  Even then, returning fire was permitted only if further loss of life 
looked likely.
49
  This considerable act of restraint demonstrated that the British did not want 
to impose their will on the Icelanders through force.  Later, when Alabaster arrived, Brigadier 
George Lammie, followed by his successor Major General Harry Curtis, implemented a 
variant: ‘Force should not be employed unless absolutely necessary’.50  Expanding on this 
point further, Donald F. Bittner writes: ‘Saboteurs were to be arrested, not shot; sabotage 
incidents were to be reported to headquarters; Icelanders assaulting or insulting the troops 
would be taken into custody and turned over to the military police.’51  Whilst abuse against 
military personnel of any nationality by Icelanders remained rare, there are documented 
incidents of certain individuals, typically youths, who were observed deliberately quarrelling 
with sentries, spitting at them and/or presenting them with Nazi salutes.
52
  Angus 
Macnaghten, during his memoir Vigil in Iceland: A Fragment of Autobiography, 1940-1942, 
recounts a rather humorous ‘little ditty’53 that, he claims, all British soldiers would become 
accustomed to: 
 
‘It’s a hap, hap, happy day, 
When the British go away, 
And the Germans come 
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With their boom, boom, boom, 
It’s a hap, hap, happy day.’54 
 
Typically, British soldiers took such taunts in their stride: ‘Don’t be so ruddy daft’,55 would 
be a common response.  To say, however, that Icelanders were completely guaranteed against 
excessive force, particularly after an altercation, would be incorrect.  The Canadian 
contingent in Iceland, also commanded by Major General Curtis, had a tendency to appear 
not dissimilar from their British partners except in two key ways, accent and temperament 
(see figure fourteen).
56
  When these troops were abused or taunted, the naive perpetrators, 
instead of receiving a relatively good humoured response, would be met with swift and strong 
reprisals – a fist full of knuckles or even a dip in the harbour.57  Canadian soldiers, it would 
seem, did not take personal insults easily, even when ordered to show restraint by their 
General Officer Commanding.
58
   
Secondly, minimal violence was inflicted against the Icelanders.  Whilst accidents 
happened, with some civilians becoming victims of these, injuries inflicted through 
unprovoked aggression or vastly disproportionate reprisals were rare and swiftly dealt with.
59
  
One notable case was when a British soldier, on 31 May 1940, ‘misconducted himself with a 
child’;60 the perpetrator was court-martialled and found to be mentally unstable.61  Another 
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notable case was when a British merchant seaman, on the late evening/early morning of 1-2 
December 1941, ‘stabbed two people’;62 the perpetrator was tried in an Icelandic court.63   
Thus far, it would appear as if the British occupation of Iceland, following 
consolidation and reinforcement, did little, if anything, to damage Icelandic freedoms.  
Unfortunately, this perception shall now be broken. 
When Howard-Smith first visited the Icelandic government on 10 May 1940, besides 
promising that Britain would support Iceland’s economy, he also promised that Britain would 
not interfere with Iceland’s domestic affairs.64  This had been a sincere undertaking; the 
British authorities in Iceland did not want to be perceived as possessing totalitarian attributes.  
Such a promise, however, proved impossible to keep when security was considered at risk 
through occurrences directly or indirectly related with Icelandic domestic affairs.  Indeed, 
‘the British saw that the reality of the military situation’,65 writes Bittner, ‘dictated a more 
activist policy.’66  Unsurprisingly, this realisation was very embarrassing for Howard-Smith.  
Therefore, in a bid to retain some credibility, he took the following stance: 
 
I told M. Stefan Joh. Stefansson that it remained true now as it was on May 10 that we 
had no intention of interfering with the civil liberties of Iceland; but he must realise 
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that it was the duty of the General Officer Commanding to take such steps as he 
thought necessary for the safety of the country and his own men.
67
 
 
It is indeed fortunate that Howard-Smith could call on his firsthand experience as Minister to 
Denmark, particularly regarding the German threat, to provide substance for such arguments. 
 Of all the rare infringements on Icelandic liberty, the vast majority were clearly 
necessary and thus encountered little protest.
68
  If an objection arose, a compromise would be 
obtained wherever possible.
69
 There remained, however, one infringement that aroused 
extreme opposition, and justifiably so.  This was the internment of troublesome Icelanders, 
people found guilty or who were suspected of, writes Bittner, ‘security violations or actions 
considered detrimental to the war effort.’70  It was not necessarily the act of interning these 
people that was so widely detested; it was more the location and result of their internment.
71
  
Alabaster did not possess sufficient detention facilities in Iceland with which to hold any 
serious trouble makers.
72
  As a result, such people were shipped over to Britain, a location 
that was dangerous to get to, dangerous to be in and ultimately, not their own country.
73
  Only 
four occurrences of deportations took place, resulting in sixteen deported Icelanders in total.   
During September 1940, two young Icelanders were deported after they had been caught in 
possession of wireless transmitters, the use of which was prohibited for civilians whilst 
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British forces remained in occupation.
74
  Next, during April 1941, four fishermen were 
deported after they had been caught corresponding with Germans.
75
  Also during this month, 
the three editors of Þjóðviljinn (hereafter anglicised as Thjodviljinn), a local communist 
newspaper, were deported.
76
  They had been sanctioning sustained written attacks on 
Alabaster that ranged variably from accusing each soldier of possessing venereal diseases, 
accusing the British military authorities of withholding pay owed to Icelandic labourers, and 
calling for strikes at the various military works, notably the aerodrome.
77
  Finally, during 
June 1941, seven inhabitants of the northwest peninsular were deported after they had been 
caught assisting a German sailor to evade capture for over twelve months.
78
  Whilst the 
second and fourth rounds of deportations produced little or no reaction – these internees were 
considered by most to have been very foolish and deserving of punishment – and whilst the 
first round of deportations produced vigorous but equally weighted opinions, the third round 
of deportations produced a major crisis in Anglo-Icelandic relations.
79
 
Thjodviljinn had been a source of great irritation to the British authorities in Iceland.  
Its pages attacked 2
nd
 Royal Marine Battalion and Alabaster mercilessly, spreading 
unfounded lies and generally causing a nuisance.
80
  Thought to have been financed by 
Moscow, Thjodviljinn targeted anyone and everyone, including the Althing.
81
  This latter 
point is rather curious as one of its three editors, Einar Olgeirsson, was also an Icelandic 
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MP.
82
  Thjodviljinn had poor circulation – approximately 1500 per year.83  As a result, the 
British authorities tolerated it; after all, censorship of Iceland’s press was not a label they 
wanted bestowed on their actions.
84
  Unfortunately, such tolerance did not last for long, and 
following one particularly serious incident, both Major General Curtis and Howard-Smith 
agreed that action would be needed to silence Thjodviljinn’s lies.85   
On 5 January 1941, two Icelanders were caught distributing leaflets amongst British 
troops.
86
  These leaflets contained information about a planned work strike that was occurring 
throughout Reykjavík and the surrounding area.
87
  In addition, they called for an outright 
insurrection should any military personnel receive orders to intervene: 
 
SOLDIERS!  Three of Iceland’s leading Trade-Unions are now on strike.  […]  In the 
docks, the factories, and the British camps, our strike is 100%.  […]  We ask that the 
standard working day in Iceland be reduced from ten to nine hours, […].  We ask that 
wages be fixed strictly according to prices, […].  Already there are signs that you will 
be used to break the strike.  […]  A man who takes over the job of a fellow-worker on 
strike is one of the most contemptible human beings.  He is a scab, a Blackleg.  Many 
of you are Trade-Unionists.  You are from the land, which is the home of Trade-
Unionism.  Surely you will not Blackleg on your fellow Trade-Unionists in Iceland.  
[…]  Soldiers, if you stand firm our victory is certain, and you will win the friendship 
and gratitude of our people.  Speak bravely to your officers.  Speak bravely in the face 
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of Ólafur Thors and his money-grabbing friends: ‘WE ARE SOLDIERS, NOT 
STRIKE-BREAKERS’.88 
 
Obviously, this incident became very serious; Major General Curtis could not afford for his 
troops to cultivate an air of disobedience.  After rapid but extensive enquiries, eight men were 
arrested, charged with offences against British forces, and tried within an Icelandic court.
89
  
The composer and translator of the leaflets received an eighteen month prison sentence whilst 
the two distributors received a four month prison sentence.
90
  In addition, much to Major 
General Curtis’ relief, two editors of Thjodviljinn, one being Olgeirsson, received a three 
month prison sentence.
91
  It transpired that the whole incident had been concocted and fuelled 
by this newspaper.
92
 
Under normal circumstances, Olgeirsson’s conviction should have put an end to 
Thjodviljinn, or at least restrained it.  The MP, however, had parliamentary immunity, a legal 
shield that postponed his sentence until the adjournment of the Althing.
93
  Consequently, 
Olgeirsson was free to continue his malicious attacks.  Major General Curtis now found 
himself in a very difficult situation.  He could no longer claim that the Icelandic constitution 
had failed to deliver justice, but a legitimate technicality had delayed justice from being 
fulfilled.  Ultimately, it seemed as if Major General Curtis could not silence Thjodviljinn 
without causing a significant political upheaval – something that had to be avoided.  His 
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hands were effectively tied.  Three months later, however, an untenable situation developed, 
one that necessitated Thjodviljinn’s immediate closure, regardless of outcome.   
On 7 April 1941, Thjodviljinn published a grossly malicious article that presented 
nothing but falsehoods regarding the working conditions of the Icelandic labourers at the yet 
unfinished airfield near Reykjavík.
94
  Indeed, it portrayed dreadful scenarios – disease, 
undernourishment and bondage – that were far from accurate.95  The article concluded by 
calling for another strike, this time at the airfield itself.
96
  These comments would prove to be 
Thjodviljinn’s undoing.  Major General Curtis desperately needed that airfield completed; 
increased airborne surveillance of Iceland and the surrounding waters was dependent on it.
97
  
Therefore, he instructed Howard-Smith to communicate with London, seeking advice.
98
  The 
response they received was swift and clear: suppress Thjodviljinn, deport its editors.
99
  
Consequently, on 28 April 1941, these instructions were carried out.
100
 
There remain questions over whether suppression of Thjodviljinn would have been 
enough to silence its vocal and malicious sentiments.  Major General Curtis, Howard-Smith 
and their superiors in London believed not.
101
  Indeed, if Olgeirsson’s conviction did little to 
change Thjodviljinn’s conduct, who is to say that an outright ban would have made any 
difference?  After all, a replacement newspaper, similar in ideology, was not beyond the 
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realms of possibility: ‘Editorial staff has brains and ability and should not be left longer at 
large.’102  Therefore, although extremely unpopular, deportation appeared necessary.   
 Regardless whether this act of censorship and these deportations were justified, it 
cannot be avoided that such decisions, albeit in the name of security, flagrantly breached 
freedom of expression, freedom of the press and the Icelandic constitution – everything 
Howard-Smith had promised would not happen.  Six days later, the Althing protested 
strongly, along with other Icelandic newspapers, about the deportations.
103
  Although the 
other MPs of the Althing disliked Olgeirsson and his newspaper, the fact that both had been 
removed by an alien occupying force completely undermined the Icelandic Government’s 
legitimate authority over local affairs.
104
  Indeed, the Althing stated that, due to its meagre 
circulation, Thjodviljinn was harmless.
105
  Vísir, newspaper of the Independence Party, 
summed up the general situation as perceived by most islanders: unimpaired liberty in 
Iceland no longer existed.
106
 
 Another area where Britain impeded Icelandic freedoms was when it unofficially 
persuaded this small nation not to break the terms of the 1918 Dano-Icelandic Act of Union 
and prematurely declare itself a republic.  During October 1940, after British forces had 
established themselves within Iceland, prominent members of the Althing began questioning 
whether they could initiate the public wish for a complete and irreversible separation from 
Denmark.
107
  Jonas Jonsson, chairman of the Socialist Unity Party, asked Howard-Smith to 
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clarify London’s opinion on this matter.108  At first, Howard-Smith responded positively, he 
believed the British Government had no opinion on the matter.
109
  Such a belief, however, 
was far from correct. 
 During January 1941, Howard-Smith took leave and returned to Britain.
110
  Whilst 
there, he was instructed by his superiors to unofficially do everything in his power to prevent 
separation of Iceland from Denmark.
111
  It was believed that if Iceland became a republic, it 
could produce serious political consequences for Britain, its image and political standing 
within Europe.
112
  Britain was not a party to the 1918 Dano-Icelandic Act of Union, and had 
promised not to interfere with Icelandic affaires.
113
  Consequently, it feared being perceived 
in Denmark and elsewhere as having facilitated this separation.
114
  Howard-Smith did as 
instructed and unofficially, during informal conversations, promoted the upholding of the 
1918 Dano-Icelandic Act of Union.
115
  A good example of this can be found on 10 February 
1941, where Howard-Smith, controversially, likened an early separation to behaviour 
conducted by Germany’s fascist regime: 
 
Indeed, it might be said that the action of Iceland in abrogating the [1918 Dano-
Icelandic] Act of Union would in essence be no different from the action of Germany 
in tearing up, in April 1940, the nonaggression treaty which she had concluded with 
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Denmark […] [during] May 1939; tearing it up because it did not suit her political 
convenience at that moment, the ordinary technique of the totalitarian state.
116
 
 
What is so striking about this whole affair is Iceland’s apparent wish for Britain’s 
approval to sever connections with Denmark, an approval Britain did not want to grant.  On 
10 February 1941, the Icelandic Prime Minister, Hermann Jónasson, gave Howard-Smith a 
dominant reason why he believed the Union could be severed; Denmark was no longer a free 
nation in charge of its own destiny.
117
  In addition, senior Icelandic law scholars legitimised 
such a decision; Denmark could not fulfil its obligations laid down in the original contract.
118
  
These were persuasive arguments, so Howard-Smith sought advice on how to respond.
119
  He 
was instructed to maintain the following line: Britain would regard the separation as a matter 
for Iceland and Denmark to deal with, but if consulted, it would promote adherence to the 
Act.
120
   
 It would appear that Howard-Smith was successful in his task of unofficially 
persuading members of the Althing to drop their idea of premature severance.  In an article 
for Tíminn, Hermann Jónasson, the Icelandic Prime Minister, stressed that Britain would 
consider any ending of the 1918 Dano-Icelandic Act of Union as an attack on the principals 
the Allies were fighting for.
121
  These views were quietly understood amongst most members 
of the Icelandic government, but not all.  Jonsson, chairman of the Progressive Party, for 
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example, published in a newspaper that Britain would support separation.
122
  To counter this, 
Jónasson, the Icelandic Prime Minister, published the official British line.
123
  This situation – 
the fact that the Icelandic Prime Minister had started relying on British policy to keep his 
position of power credible – demonstrates how influential, albeit unofficially, Britain had 
become.  In the end, a decision regarding the declaration of a complete and irreversible 
republic was dropped towards the latter half of 1941 and would not surface again in any 
meaningful debate until after the British occupation of Iceland had concluded.
124
 It would 
appear that British reservations to the separation were stimulated by Whitehall’s concern for 
its nation’s image.  Fundamentally, the British invasion and occupation of Iceland was illegal, 
albeit for righteous intentions.  This deed did not need highlighting with further acts of 
illegality.   
 Thus far, Chapter Two of this dissertation has addressed whether, throughout 20 May 
1940-22 April 1942, the British occupation preserved Icelandic freedoms.  It has not 
addressed whether the British occupation secured Allied interests in Northern Europe, 
something that shall now be discussed.   
Following the fall of France, retention of Iceland as a base for British forces meant 
that access to and from the North Atlantic still remained practicable.
125
  This was very 
important; it meant that the Allies could provide a relatively secure passage for their 
merchant ships when approaching or leaving Britain.
126
  Indeed, scholars believe that, had 
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Germany invaded, complete closure of the northern approach would have been total, just like 
the southern approach.
127
 
By the end of 1941, following completion of the military bases in Iceland, a 
remarkable shift in local dominance took place, the Allies gained almost complete and 
uncompromising control of the sea surrounding Iceland.
128
  Such a scenario had not always 
been the case.  During September 1940, 267,618 tons of shipping had been destroyed by 
enemy U-boats, whilst a further 53,283 tons had been destroyed by enemy aircraft, all on the 
northern approach.
129
  In total, 1940 saw 1,805,495 tons of shipping destroyed whilst 
January-June 1941 saw 1,800,190 tons of shipping destroyed.
130
  All this, however, would 
change.  On 28 May 1941, Reykjavik airfield opened and accepted its first aircraft.
131
  From 
then on, increased air cover was practicable over the North Atlantic.  Indeed, so successful 
was it that between c. 8 July-19 August 1941, not one ship had been lost to enemy action – a 
tremendous achievement (see figure fifteen).
132
  This air cover, along with the newly opened 
naval base at Hvalfjörður – a facility that offered services for convoy escort and merchant 
ships – meant, finally, Britain’s significant lifeline for much needed food and war resources 
received near complete coverage across the North Atlantic (see figure sixteen).
133
  What had 
originally been a desperate enterprise to deny a piece of land from Germany had turned into 
an enterprise to conduct crucial services in aid of the Allies’ war effort.  This achievement 
had resulted from, firstly, maintaining a continually open doorway for merchant ships in and 
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out of Britain; secondly, providing a base for aircraft and naval ships to escort merchant ships 
to and from North America; thirdly, providing a stop-off-point for aircraft on the long 
journey to and from Britain and the North America; and fourthly, providing a staging post for 
merchant ships from Britain and North America before they commenced the incredibly 
dangerous journey north-east towards Russia – who was also under attack by Germany.134  
‘London’s sudden, essentially unprepared and unplanned decision to send forces there’,135 
writes Bittner, ‘was rewarded in ways unforeseen in the spring of 1940.’136   
The third and final way the occupation of Iceland secured Allied interests in Northern 
Europe was by providing an excellent training ground in which to prepare Allied troops for 
combat (see figure seventeen).  The island, at times, had a harsh and forbidding environment; 
training within tough conditions would produce soldiers capable of defeating battle hardened 
Axis forces.
137
  Equally important, this training also taught British soldiers how to survive on 
Iceland.
138
  Throughout 10 May 1940-22 April 1942, only 128 soldiers perished on 
Iceland.
139
   Whilst these deaths resulted from a number of reasons, enemy action being one 
of them, most were due to environmental factors such as weather and terrain with 
accompanying disorientation and/or human error.
140
  The losses would undoubtedly have 
been greater had training not been undertaken to overcome the island conditions. 
When considering the above essential points, whereas the first nineteen days of the 
British occupation of Iceland – covered within Chapter One of this dissertation – failed 
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entirely to preserve Icelandic freedoms and secure Allied interests in Northern Europe, the 
period following, 20 May 1940-22 April 1942, counters this perception.  Iceland’s economy 
was secured. This outcome was achieved, firstly, through Britain guaranteeing all Iceland’s 
exports, and secondly, through eradication of unemployment resulting from demands for 
labour on critical construction projects.  In addition, Iceland received further material benefits 
through goodwill gestures.  Granted, there were occasions, throughout 20 May 1940-22 April 
1942, where Britain’s actions hampered Icelandic freedoms – for example, the deportation of 
sixteen Icelanders and the forced closure of an Icelandic newspaper – but these were justified 
and reduced in significance due to the financial and social profit and long term security 
obtained.  Allied interests, by contrast, had only positive long-term outcomes.  Firstly, the 
occupation ensured that an enemy blockade of Britain’s one and only access point to and 
from the North Atlantic was precluded, and secondly, the occupation allowed for construction 
of facilities, such as air and naval bases, that would be immeasurably beneficial to Britain’s 
North Atlantic supply line.  Finally, Iceland provided an excellent training ground where 
Alabaster’s soldiers could hone their fighting skills in preparation for the day when they 
would face Adolf Hitler’s elite forces throughout mainland Europe. 
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Figure Thirteen
141
 – Civilian Labourers in Iceland. 
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Figure Fourteen
142
 – Canadian Soldiers in Iceland. 
 
 
Figure Fifteen
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Figure Sixteen
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Figure Seventeen
145
 – Ski Troops on Exercise in Iceland. 
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Conclusion 
 The British invasion and occupation of Iceland is one of the most under 
researched and unknown events from the Second World War.  A general survey on 
proceedings throughout 1939-1945 will, typically, omit any detail greater than date and 
reason for occurrence.  Second World War by Martin Gilbert and A World at Arms: A 
Global History of World War II by Gerhard L. Weinberg both exemplify this point.
1
  
Furthermore, its limited historiography, as has already been detailed, offers little 
meaningful analysis.  Consequently, so that greater understanding could be attained 
regarding outcome, this dissertation, entitled ‘The Uninvited Guests: Britain’s Military 
Forces in Iceland, 1940-1942’, has attempted to answer one specific but pertinent 
question: to what extent did the British invasion and subsequent occupation of Iceland 
preserve Icelandic freedoms and secure Allied interests in Northern Europe? 
This dissertation covers two periods throughout 10 May 1940-22 April 1942, 
firstly, 10-19 May 1940; and secondly, 20 May 1940-22 April 1942.  The former covers 
the invasion and first nineteen days of occupation, the period in which Iceland’s defence 
was in the hands of the 2
nd
 Royal Marine Battalion (hereafter 2RM), whilst the latter 
covers the remaining 703 days, the period in which the defence of Iceland was left 
predominantly in the hands of 147
th
 Infantry Brigade (hereafter Alabaster).  On 10 May 
1940, 815 Marines from 2
nd
 Royal Marine Battalion landed in Iceland and established 
control of Reykjavík.  They successfully achieved their objectives: firstly, to capture all 
strategic locations; secondly, to capture all enemy aliens and sympathisers; thirdly, to 
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make all defensive arrangements possible; fourthly, to obtain co-operation of the local 
law enforcement agency; and fifthly, to conduct friendly relations with the Icelandic 
government.  It would certainly appear as if Operation Fork had been a triumph.  The 
dissertation, however, showed otherwise: firstly, little time had been set aside with which 
to plan everything; secondly, nobody within 2
nd
 Royal Marine Battalion or the 
accompanying intelligence detachment could speak either German or Icelandic; thirdly, 
only three maps – one drawn from memory – had been gathered; and fourthly, despite 
leaving unchecked stores at Greenock, stores that might have been invaluable, the force 
was late sailing.  The dissertation subsequently questioned how the Admiralty could have 
let such chaos occur, particularly with reference to the lack of maps. The conclusion was 
because of there being very little time from the decision to invade Iceland to the 
commencement of the operation.  The dissertation then moved on to analyse the 
composition of 2
nd
 Royal Marine Battalion and found it to be substandard.  Little training, 
particularly with weapons handling, had been undertaken – fifty soldiers had never fired 
their weapons – whilst none of the weapons issued, including the heavy support weapons, 
were in an operational state of readiness.  The dissertation argued that 2
nd
 Royal Marine 
Battalion was in no state to fight.  The dissertation, having kept its findings on Fork and 
2RM in mind, then moved on to analyse the composition of the predicted opponents that 
2RM were expecting to face during and soon after Fork.  There was found to be a stark 
contrast, not so much with the first wave of expected opponents – the Icelandic police 
and local German residents/shipwrecked sailors, who still could have put up some 
notable resistance – but the second, the land forces of the Wermacht.  The Wermacht 
would have been efficient, expertly trained and well equipped.  As the concluding words 
80 
 
of Chapter One’s analysis states, the predicted German army was everything 2RM was 
not – the German army would have all but obliterated this small band of British 
defenders.  Ultimately, Chapter One shows that the British invasion and first nineteen 
days of the occupation did little to preserve Icelandic freedoms or secure Allied interests 
in Northern Europe – it took Iceland’s right to remain conflict free and, due to the quality 
of Fork and 2RM, offered the Allies little security from enemy activity in that region. 
On 20 May 1940, a force codenamed Alabaster, comprising troops from the 
British Army and subsequently from the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, assumed 
control of Iceland’s defence.  The dissertation found that this force was initially as 
equally unprepared to defend Iceland.  Not for long, however, for within six weeks, the 
minimal security requirements of the island had been assured.  Whereas Chapter One 
focused its analysis predominantly on the British military, Chapter Two focused its 
analysis predominantly on the occupation’s significant effect on Iceland’s way of life.  
The dissertation first studied the effects that the occupation had on all Icelandic exports 
and found that Britain agreed to take on all of the trade that Iceland would have lost with 
Britain’s enemies, if not more.  This the dissertation found to be important, not just for 
Iceland, who needed the trade, but also for Britain, who needed the food that Iceland 
exported.  The dissertation then proceeded to study the effects the occupation had on the 
Island’s mass unemployment and found that within a very short time, there ceased to be 
unemployment – with obvious benefits to the island population.  Other obvious benefits, 
the dissertation discovered, were derived from the British military’s need to pay for 
services to help it conduct the occupation, and the British military’s various good-will 
gestures, designed to show that it cared.  At this point it seemed as if no element of the 
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occupation, following Alabaster’s reinforcement, produced a detrimental effect upon 
Iceland.  The dissertation, however, soon discovered that such elements did exist.  Whilst 
officially, Britain made sincere promises not to interfere with local Icelandic affairs, the 
dissertation discovered this was an unrealistic promise. A number of examples were 
found where Icelandic national security was compromised through the actions of naive, 
stupid or malicious Icelanders.  The results of these actions were the forced deportation to 
Britain of the perpetrators, the most controversial being deportation of editors and the 
forced closure of a newspaper  Although the publication was unpopular on the island, this 
action to close was more so as many felt it was a disproportionate and unnecessary cap on 
the freedom of speech.  The dissertation also found the British diplomatic authorities 
meddled in local affairs by influencing the delay in the Althing’s attempt to promote 
independence.  The influence was so great that the Icelandic Prime Minister relied on 
confidential British policy to support his position in office as he tried to promote a delay 
in gaining independence.  The Prime Minister needed to make public Britain’s standing 
on the subject to persuade other members of the Althing that it was in their country’s 
interest to delay.  The dissertation finally analysed the effect the occupation had on Allied 
security in Northern Europe.  It found, following the reinforcement of Alabaster, security 
had taken a complete u-turn from providing no security to significant security.  The 
dissertation found that not only did the occupation ensure entry and exit routes to the 
North Atlantic remained open and free from the threat of closure, it also allowed for 
enhanced Allied protection for the convoys of supplies travelling to and from North 
America.  Finally, the dissertation determined that Iceland proved to be a diverse and 
superb training ground for British troops to develop their battle skills on uncomfortable 
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and hostile terrain.  Ultimately, Chapter Two showed that the British occupation of 
Iceland following 20 May 1940 greatly preserved Icelandic freedoms and secured Allied 
interests in Northern Europe.  Iceland developed economically and socially whilst Allied 
convoys received enhanced protection thus ensuring many lives were saved. 
In conclusion, this dissertation has demonstrated that the British occupation of 
Iceland was an overall success.  It assisted long term with Iceland’s economic and social 
development whilst assisting the Allies with winning the war. Granted, militarily the first 
nineteen days were an absolute disaster.  The military put Iceland at risk for no 
perceivable gain.  Following an unfavourable start however, with the greater investment 
in resources, the military corrected its deficiencies and created an environment in which 
mutual benefits could flourish. 
The British occupation concluded on 22 April 1942 when American forces 
assumed complete responsibility for Iceland’s defence.2  This did not mean the British 
withdrew completely, the Royal Air force, for example, maintained a presence on the 
island until 1947.
3
  The Army, along with its commanding officer, Major General Curtis, 
slowly returned to Britain on and following 22 April 1942.
4
  The occupation had not been 
easy; problems were encountered but successfully overcome.  Anglo-Icelandic relations 
had both high and low points but concluded strong, secure and above all, on good terms: 
                                                 
2
 The National Archives, FO 371/32749, Howard-Smith to Eden, 21 April 1942, p. 1 and The National 
Archives, WO 176/290, anonymous to all British soldiers in Iceland, 22 April 1942. 
 
3
 D. F. Bittner, The Lion and the White Falcon: Britain an Iceland in the World War II Era (Hamden: 
Archon Books, 1983), p. 144. 
 
4
 Ibid. 
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‘It was a particularly unique example in history’,5 summarised Árni Jónsson, a member 
of the Althing throughout 1940-1942 and a member of Reykjavík City Council 
throughout 1942-1945, ‘of an occupying Army which was better liked on the day of its 
departure than on the day of its arrival.’6  On 19 April 1942, Major General Curtis 
attended luncheon with Major General Charles Bonesteel, the day before this senior 
American commander assumed control of all Allied forces on Iceland.
7
  At this gathering, 
Major General Bonesteel, under orders from the President of America, decorated Major 
General Curtis with the Distinguished Service Medal – for two years he had managed the 
situation in Iceland and earned the respect of his troops.
8
  That night, Major General 
Curtis wrote a letter to Howard-Smith, thanking him for all his assistance throughout the 
past two years.
9
 
Howard-Smith is, arguably, one of Britain’s unsung heroes, an unsung hero from 
an unsung success story of British foreign and military policy.  He should be credited, 
along with the average British soldier, for facilitating much of what was good about 
Anglo-Icelandic relations throughout 1940-1942.  To senior Icelanders and Britons alike, 
Howard-Smith – through his advice, patience, understanding and empathy – became a 
friend, a confidant, a go-between; a receptacle for criticism when Anglo-Icelandic 
relations were troubled; and someone who could interpret opposing political standpoints. 
He was a consummate diplomat and a tactful intermediary.  It is very sad that Howard-
                                                 
5
 Bittner, The Lion and the White Falcon, p. 160, cited from Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, 
vol. 398, col. 889. 
 
6
 Ibid. 
 
7
 The National Archives, FO 371/32749, Howard-Smith to Eden, 21 April 1942, p. 1. 
 
8
 Ibid. 
 
9
 Ibid., Curtis to Howard-Smith, 20 April, 1942. 
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Smith would fail to see peace in Europe; he died in Iceland on 23 July 1942.
10
  During his 
funeral, Icelanders lined the cortège’s path whilst Icelandic politicians followed on foot.11  
This outpouring of emotion, this public and official demonstration of mourning, is ‘mute 
evidence’,12 writes Bittner, that British policy on this small island in the North Atlantic 
had been, ultimately, a success story. 
                                                 
10
 The National Archives, FO 371/36784, ‘Annual Report on Iceland for the Year 1942’, 19 January 1943, 
p. 1. 
 
11
 Ibid. 
 
12
 Bittner, The Lion and the White Falcon, p. 114. 
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Appendix 
The following text has been transcribed from a War Office document.  See bibliography 
under WO 176/287 for access details.  Spelling, grammar, and punctuation appear as original. 
 
-- start -- 
 
TEN COMMANDMENTS 
for British Troops in Iceland. 
 
1. Don’t forget that this is the first time that British troops have landed in Iceland: we 
represent the British Empire and it is by our behaviour, discipline, and bearing that the 
British will be judged. 
 
2. Don’t forget that the farm or house where you may be billeted temporarily is the 
Icelanders home, and treat it as you would like to have your own home treated if the 
positions were reversed. 
 
3. Do not judge the inhabitants too hastily, remember that our ways may be as strange to 
them as theirs are to us.  Remember that we are in the position of being their guests 
and treat them with studious politeness at all time. 
 
4. Remember that things which seem natural to us because they are British, may, 
unknown to us, shock and even wound the Icelander; we are used to treating each 
other in a very off handed way.  Foreigners are very much more polite to one another, 
therefore let us try to be much more polite to them than we would be to one another. 
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5. Treat the womenfolk as you would like your own wives or sister to be treated.  Give 
them a helping hand if you see them doing a heavy bit of work.  Make friends with 
the children. 
 
6. Guard against boredom: there may be spells of inactivity when you may be inclined to 
grouse about things and get down on your luck.  Try and keep yourself employed by 
familiarising yourself with the weapons at your deposal, no matter what branch of the 
service you may belong to. 
 
7. Don’t stay in a rut.  When you have got fully conversant with one job try and learn 
something ells.  Pay particular attention to dress and discipline, it all makes for 
efficiency.  You may not be in the Guards but there is no reason why you should not 
emulate their smartness and their efficiency. 
 
8. Don’t spread or listen to rumours.  There will be enemy agents whose job it is to 
spread uneasiness by clever propaganda; they have been most successful in some 
places, so let us see that this is not the case in Iceland.  Another point : although we 
want to be friendly with the civil population, let us be particularly careful about 
giving away any military information of any sort: it may seem trivial to you, but 
pieced together by a skilled agent it may be of great value to the enemy. 
 
9. Many Icelanders speak English but very few English people speak Icelandic.  There is 
no surer way to the heart of a people than to learn their language and to teach them 
yours and it will help to while away the time and encourage friendship. 
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10. Remember that articles which you may consider to be trifles of little or no value, may 
be of value to their owners.  Never take things, even for fire wood, without the 
owner’s permission: ‘scrounging’ may be understood in the army but it is most 
unpopular with foreigners. 
 
-- end -- 
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